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INTRODUCTION

When a Navajo tribal member commits a serious felony against another
Navajo on the remote Navajo Indian Reservation, the crime sets in motion
not a tribal criminal investigation and tribal court proceeding, but a federal
investigation and federal court proceeding under the federal Major Crimes
1
Act. For trial, the Navajo defendant, the Navajo victim, and the witnesses
(all of whom are also likely to be Navajo) will be summoned to a federal
district court far away from the reservation and the specific community
where the crime occurred. Unlike a felony involving only non-Indians,
which would be routinely adjudicated at the local county or district court
house, the Navajo felony will be tried in a distant federal court in Phoenix,

Salt Lake City, or Albuquerque. 2

The federal court operates in a language that is foreign to many Navajos;
thus the Navajo defendants, victims, and witnesses may require interpreters
to translate the proceedings. Neither the judge, the court reporter, the prose
cutor,3

the court security officers, the deputy marshals, nor the defense

1.

1 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 53 (2000). Even if tribal police investigate the offense, the tribal police

may very well be acting with federal funding, administering a federal responsibility, and acting, in
effect, as federal agents. See, e.g., Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act, Pub. L. No . 1 0 1 -379, 104
Stat. 473 ( 1 990) (codified primarily at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809 (2000)).

2. D epending in part on the precise location where the crime occurred and in part on the
pleasure of the federal judge assigned to hear the matter, such a case might also be tried in Prescott,
Arizona, or Santa Fe, New Mexico, though these locations are also substantially distant from the
Navajo reservation.

3.

The Navajo Nation is the second largest Indian tribe in the United States. It has a legal

culture so well established that it has long had its own bar examination and a court system with
numerous district courts and a supreme court that, together, hear tens of thousands civil and misde
meanor

cases

each

year.

See

HARVARD

LAW

SCH.,

NAVAJO

NATION

COURTS

(2004),
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attorney or investigator are likely to be Navajo or even understand or speak
the Navajo language. Perhaps even more importantly, the federal jury that
hears the evidence is unlikely to include a Navajo, or even an Indian, or any
4
other member of the community where the crime occurred.
While the Navajo Nation provides a compelling example of such alien
ation because it ranges across three states and is inhabited by more than

180,000 people in hundreds of distinct Indian communities, this federal
criminal justice regime spans more than one hundred Indian reservations
across the United States and involves thousands of federal cases opened
5
each year within "Indian country" as that term is defined by federal law.
Thus, similar circumstances can be described for many other Indian tribes
and their reservations, such as the Jicarilla Apache in northern New Mexico,
the Hualapi who live adjacent to the Grand Canyon in Arizona, the Red
Lake Chippewa in northern Minnesota, or the various Chippewa and Po
tawatomi tribes in Michigan's upper peninsula.
Serious practical problems arise by virtue of the vast distances between
some Indian reservations and the federal courts that serve them. Consider,
for example, the challenge facing a victim or witness from the Red Lake
Band of Ojibwe Reservation near the Canadian border in northern Minne
sota who may be required by federal summons to travel 250 miles or more
of back roads and highways to reach federal court in St. Paul or Minneapo
lis, Minnesota.6 While such distances would be daunting to anyone,

residents of Indian reservations (and certainly victims and witnesses to vio
7
lent crime) tend to have incomes well below the poverty level. It is fair to
assume that most reservation residents drive vehicles consistent with their
8
Indeed, the "Indian car" has become nearly as

respective income levels.

http://lapahie.com/courts.cfm. Yet not one of the dozens of federal prosecutors who prosecute all of
the federal felonies from the Navajo reservation is a Navajo tribal member.
4. See, e.g., United States v. Footracer, 1 89 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1 999) (holding that the
transfer of a case to a district court division with a much lower percentage of American Indians did
not deprive defendant of a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community); United States v.
Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d 420, 425-26 (9th Cir. 1 997) (finding no evidence of discriminatory jury selection
in this case but noting in dicta that the systematic transfer of cases to district court divisions with
lower percentages of American Indians might result in the discriminatory exclusion of American
Indians); United States v. Turcotte, 558 F.2d 893, 895 (8th Cir. 1 977) (noting that there were no
American Indians on the jury, although defendant failed to prove discrimination in the jury selection
system).
5.

See 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 1 (2000) .

6. The distance from the Red Lake Reservation to Minneapolis is approximately 250 miles
and might take nearly six hours even with good road conditions. Similarly, the Fort Peck Reserva
tion is nearly 300 miles from the federal courts in either Great Falls or Billings, and both drives
could easily take six hours in good weather. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 657--62 (4th ed. 2004).
7. Low income is correlated with a high rate of violent crime victimization for American
Indians. STEVEN w. PERRY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN INDIANS AND CRIME: A BJS STATIS
TICAL PROFILE, 1 992-2002, at 5 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bj s/pub/pdf/
aic02.pdf; see also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AMERICAN INDIANS & CRIME 5 ( 1 999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bj s/pub/pdf/aic.pdf.
8.
In 1 999, 4 1 .5% of the residents of the Navajo Nation, for example, had household in
comes of less than $ 14,999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED EcONOMIC
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fabled today as the Plains Indian pony was in the past, but for vastly differ
9
ent reasons.
In sum, a witness in an Indian country case may be facing a five-hour
or longer drive in an untrustworthy vehicle in a northern winter with noth
ing to look forward to but being forced to speak in public in front of a
large group of non-Indian strangers, or being forced to endure a painful
cross-examination in which her motives and perhaps her character will be
11
questioned. IO Consider also the unfortunate federal prosecutor or defense
attorney: a harried trial attorney working hard to marshal the evidence in a
criminal case while nervously looking out the window of the federal court
house (at falling snow in Minneapolis in winter or the scorching desert
terrain in Arizona in the summer time) and desperately hoping that her
witnesses appear on time to testify.

12

As a result of a series of federal statutes, felony criminal justice is pri
marily a federal responsibility on hundreds of Indian reservations in the
13
Southeast, the Midwest, and throughout the western United States. Though
the problems identified above are simple, practical obstacles to effective
CHARACTERISTICS: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION TRUST LAND

3 (2000),

available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/2502430.pdf. Likewise, 32.3% of residents of the
Fort Peck Reservation and 34.6% of residents of the Red Lake Reservation earned household in
comes of less than $ 1 4,999 in 1 999. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROALE Of SELECTED EcoNOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: FORT PECK RESERVATION AND OFF-RESERVATION
TRUST LAND 3 (2000), available at http://centstats.census.gov/data/US/2501 250.pdf.
9.
The phrase "Indian cat" has become a term of art in Indian country, and was immortal
ized in a song by the same name by Bois Forte Chippewa recording artist Keith Secola and his Wild
Band of Indians. KEITH SECOLA AND THE WILD BAND OF INDIANS, Indian Car, on CIRCLE (Nor
mal/ Akina Records 1992). In the song, Secola describes the stereotypical Indian car: "My car is
dented, the radiator steams I Head light don't work, radio can scream I Got a sticker, says "Indian
power" I On my bumper, holds my cat together." The 1 999 Miramax film release Smoke Signals
features an Indian car that can only drive in reverse, derived from a Sherman Alexie story. SHERMAN
ALEXIE, THE LONE RANGER AND TONTO FISTAGHT IN HEAVEN 1 56 (HatperPerennial 1 994) ( 1 993);
SMOKE SIGNALS (Miramax 1998). In sum, the Indian cat is generally considered far less reliable
than the Indian pony of the nineteenth century.
IO. American Indians age twelve and over are victims of rape and sexual assault at a rate
nearly four times that of all races (seven Indian victims per 1 000, compared to two victims per 1 000
for all races). GREENFELD & SMITH, supra note 7, at 3.
1 1 . As a practical matter, federal prosecutors in such cases rely heavily on victim/witness
coordinators, often tribal members themselves, who work in the United States Attorneys' Offices.
Victim/witness coordinators provide a host of duties to prosecutors and crime victims. One of the
most basic is to ensure that Indian victims and witnesses are provided transportation and accommo
dations so that they can appear for trial. The victim/witness coordinators are vital to the federal
prosecutors, and most cases that go to trial would not be successful without their hard work, their
careful logistical planning, and the supportive bond they form with the Indian victims and witnesses.
For a description of the role these employees play, see generally U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS
AND WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING YOUR RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM (2002), avail
able at http://www.justice.gov/usao/alm/LECC/VW_Rights.htm.
1 2.
Larry EchoHawk, Child Sexual Abuse in Indian Country: ls the Guardian Keeping in
Mind the Seventh Generation ?, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & Pus. PoL'Y 83, 99 (200 1 ) ("[T]ravel time [in
federal Indian country cases] is often three or four hours or more. When witnesses have to travel far
to give testimony, they sometimes do not show up.").
1 3.
On some reservations in so-called Public Law 280 states, this responsibility is a state and
local one. See generally Carol E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 ( 1 975).
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criminal justice, they may represent problems that are far more serious. In
the United States, criminal justice is an inherently local activity as a matter
of constitutional design; American criminal justice systems are carefully
designed to empower local communities to solve internal problems and to
restore peace and harmony in the community. Viewed in this light, many of
the practical problems outlined above, and more serious ones discussed be
low, may represent violations of fundamental constitutional norms. In short,
federal justice in Indian country simply may not accord with many of the
basic legal principles that guide American courts, prosecutors, and law en
forcement officials.
Consider some of the most obvious questions raised by a federal Indian
country prosecution: Does an Indian defendant receive a trial by a jury of
his peers when he faces a federal jury in a distant city composed of non
Indians who are foreign to the Indian community, who may very well speak
a different language and who are subject to a different set of laws and a dif
ferent process for adjudicating them? Does an Indian community have a
voice in issues of public safety when its local felonies are prosecuted, de
fended, and adjudicated in distant and foreign tribunals by federal officials
who are not accountable to tribal leaders or the community? Are basic re
quirements of fairness and due process met when defendants, crime victims,
and witnesses are summoned to court hundreds of miles away to testify
about simple but serious local crimes that occurred in their own backyards?
Can a community enjoy its right to a "public trial" when a local crime is
adjudicated in a non-televised trial hundreds of miles away in a city that is
14
difficult to reach from the reservation? As these questions suggest, the fed
eral Indian country criminal justice scheme is subject to a host of criticisms
derived from implicit constitutional values of federalism and localism and
explicit constitutional requirements of criminal procedure.
Among the chief sources of criticism of the federal Indian country
15
criminal justice system is the prevalence of crime against Indians. Indians
are far more likely than members of all other major racial classes to be victims
of violent crime. An American Indian or Alaska Native is two-and-a-half
times more likely than a member of the general public to be a victim of vio
16
lent crime and twice as likely as an African American. From 1 992 through

2001, the average annual rate of violent victimizations among Indians was

14.
This list of questions leaves out a host of equal protection questions potentially raised by
prosecutions in Indian country, such as disparities between federal and state sentences for identical
offenses based on the racial identities of the perpetrators and victims. The Supreme Court has gen
erally indicated that equal protection claims premised on race are not salient in Indian law given the
unique political status of Indians and Indian tribes recognized in the Constitution. See United States
v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 ( 1977).

For an extensive review of then-existing research in involving Indians and crime, see
( 1999). Lester challenges research studies as
serting that Indians commit crime more than other minority groups, but does not address the
assertions that Indians are victimized at higher rates. See generally also RoNET BACHMAN, DEATH
AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVATION ( 1992).
15.

DAVID LESTER, CRIME AND THE NATIVE AMERICAN

16.

PERRY,

supra note 7 at 5-6.
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17

10 1 per 1,000 residents twelve years of age and older. This compares to
fifty violent victimizations per 1,000 blacks, forty-one per 1,000 whites and
18
twenty-two per 1,000 Asians. Sexual offenses against women and children
are especially serious problems in Indian country.

19

In discussing the high crime rates on Indian reservations, academics
fault federal prosecutors and law enforcement agents who are accused of
declining meritorious prosecutions, particularly of non-Indian offenders.
Congress has found fault too, but has treated the issue as a resource alloca
tion problem. In recent years, Congress has dramatically increased funding
and positions for federal prosecutors and FBI agents who work these
cases. But the problems that exist in Indian country criminal justice may
be far deeper than a lack of enthusiasm by federal prosecutors or an insuf
ficient number of federal prosecutors and investigators to perform the
tasks. It may stem from structural problems in the system.
For thirty-five years, federal policymakers have moved more and more
decisively in the context of Indian law and policy toward an approach that
fosters "tribal self-determination" and have sought to restore the powers of
tribal governments. As a result of the advance of federal Indian policy, the
federal criminal justice system in Indian country no longer rests comfortably
within the mainstream of federal Indian policy. To some degree it seems to
be a relic, perhaps, of colonialism. While the notion of community "self
determination" has been enthusiastically embraced only fairly recently in
federal Indian policy, it is a long-standing and hallowed norm in American
criminal justice. Indeed, many of the key institutions of the federal criminal
justice system, such as juries, were designed to assure community control of
criminal justice. Given that American criminal justice is designed in many
respects to build in "self-determination" as its own guiding principle, it is
perhaps ironic that criminal justice in Indian country has been resistant to
such notions.
Thus, rather than challenging the existing system on the grounds that it
is inconsistent with federal Indian policy, this Article instead asks a more
fundamental question: is this federal criminal justice system consistent
with its own prevailing norms? In other words, this Article evaluates the
federal Indian country criminal justice regime, not against norms of Indian
law and policy, but against those of criminal law and policy. Specifically,
this Article evaluates the federal constitutional norms that lie at the heart
of American criminal justice and that are designed to ensure the legitimacy
of federal criminal trials. Toward that end, Part I presents a critical de
scription of key facets of the federal Indian country criminal justice
system. Part II begins the critical evaluation by evaluating a key institu
tional player in the federal system, the federal prosecutor. It highlights the

17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

PATRICIA TJADEN

&

NANCY THOENNES,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT ON THE

PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles l/nij/183781.pdf.

21-23 (2000) ,
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handicaps faced by federal prosecutors in Indian country prosecutions and
questions whether prosecutorial discretion can be exercised appropriately
when "outsiders" prosecute local crimes in Indian country. Part III focuses
on another key institution in criminal justice, the jury. It describes the role
that juries serve in American criminal justice and explains why federal
juries in Indian country cases cannot perform some of these functions,
leaving them inadequate under the Sixth Amendment. Part IV turns to the
somewhat related topics of venue and the right to a public trial, examining
whether the existing Major Crimes Act system is consistent with prevail
ing First Amendment values of public access and general constitutional
principles of venue and vicinage in criminal cases.
I. THE MODERN STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF
INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL JUSTICE
A brief introduction to the current contours of criminal justice in Indian
country, and a critical description of the process from the viewpoint of the
Indian community is helpful to understanding the complex problems that the
system must address.
A. A Legal Description of the Indian Country Regime
The federal Indian country criminal justice regime consists primarily
20

of a trio of federal laws that create a complex jurisdictional framework.

The first of the three statutes is 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 1, which defines no of
fenses but merely sets forth the geographic scope of federal Indian country
jurisdiction. Literally defining the term "Indian country," § 1 1 5 1 demar
cates

federal

jurisdiction

as

extending

to

all

lands

within

Indian

reservations as well as so-called "dependent Indian communities" and al
21
lotments to which the Indian titles have not been extinguished. While
interpretation of the statute is relatively straightforward, recent cases have
imposed a distinct judicial gloss that has both expanded and narrowed the
scope of the plain language in significant ways. For example, the Tenth
Circuit has held that Indian country includes some federal trust lands that

20. The entire scheme is set out in much greater detail in Robert N. Clinton, Criminal Juris
diction Over Indian Lands: A Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 503 (1976).
The United States Code defines a handful of other offenses related to highly specific subjects, such
as intoxicating liquors, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1154-56 ( 2000), gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (2000), and
unauthorized hunting, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (2000), but these offenses are rarely prosecuted.
21.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title, the term "Indian country",
as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State, and (c) all Indian allot
ments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running
through the same.
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do not otherwise fit neatly within the three categories set forth in the statute. 22 In contrast, the Supreme Court has so narrowly defined the second
category, "dependent Indian communities," that the phrase would no
longer seem to apply to those communities that originally gave the phrase
23
its meaning.
•

•

The other two key statutes are the Major Crimes Act, set forth at 18
U.S.C. § 1153 and another statute known variously as the Indian Country
4
Crimes Act or the General Crimes Act2 (the latter will be used here, in
contradistinction to "Major Crimes Act"). The General Crimes Act pro
vides that the general federal laws enacted to apply to locations within
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, also known generally as
the federal enclaves laws, apply in Indian country. One of the federal en
5
claves laws, the Assimilative Crimes Act, 2 provides that any state criminal
law of the state in which the lands are located can be assimilated if there is
no federal criminal law on point. Because of this provision, the General
Crimes Act allows a federal prosecution for virtually any conceivable of
fense, whether misdemeanor or felony.
While the General Crimes Act appears tremendously broad, it has
some limitations. First, as a matter of federalism, federal courts have held
that the law may not be used to prosecute a crime in which no Indians are
26
As a result, the General Crimes Act may be used to prosecute a

involved.

non-Indian only if the non-Indian has committed a crime against an In
dian. Second, the General Crimes Act explicitly excludes offenses by one
Indian against another. Thus, a prosecution against an Indian under the
General Crimes Act is available only if the Indian commits a crime against
a non-Indian. The General Crimes Act existed before the Major Crimes

22. See Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 453 n.2 (1995) (using term
"informal reservation"); United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1129-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (declar
ing that Indian Country jurisdiction extends over tribal lands held in trust by the federal government,
even though such land is not within an Indian reservation, is not an allotment, and does not techni
cally meet the definition of "dependent Indian community").
23. Compare Alaska v. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998), with
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). See also Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 3 5 TULSA L.J. 73 (1999) (criticizing the
Venetie decision's narrow interpretation of the term).
24.

Section 1152 declares:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or prop
erty of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has
been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the ex
clusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.

18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2000).
25.

18 u.s.c. § 13 (2000).

26.

See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (providing that if a non-Indian

commits a crime against another non-Indian, then the state has exclusive jurisdiction because there
is no federal interest in the case).
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Act and originally arose as a way to address conflict between Indians and
settlers and to federalize protection of each against one another. 27
The Major Crimes Act addressed this second limitation. As a matter of
respect for the sovereignty of Indian tribes, Congress never applied the
General Crimes Act to offenses between Indians.28 In the Major Crimes
Act, however, Congress gave federal prosecutors authority to prosecute
certain "major" crimes by Indians against Indians or others. The Major
Crimes Act thus intruded into an area of exclusive tribal sovereignty and
made federal law enforcement officers the primary agents for adjudicating
serious crimes on Indian reservations.
Viewed together, the Indian country definition, the Major Crimes Act,
and the General Crimes Act constitute the jurisdictional apparatus for
bringing criminal cases in Indian country into federal court. None of these
laws, however, provides the substantive offenses to which they refer. The
substantive definitions must be found elsewhere in the criminal code and,
if the Assimilative Crimes Act is used, in state law. This means, of course,
that the serious crimes in Indian country are defined by federal and state
officials, not by tribal officials.
Complementing this trio of federal statutes is the Indian Civil Rights
Act. That Act strips tribes of jurisdiction over crimes punished by sen
tences greater than one year of imprisonment or a fine of more than
$5000.29 As a result, tribes may define and prosecute any offense, but be
cause of the sentencing limitation, tribal offenses would be labeled
federally as misdemeanors. As a result, though many tribes have active
criminal court dockets, only the federal government-and not tribes-can
address serious crimes with felony sentences. The Indian Civil Rights Act
thus has the effect of elevating the importance of the federal criminal jus
tice regime in Indian country and giving it primacy.

27.

See Clinton, supra note 20, at 537.

28.

Thus, while most of the Indian law and policy criticisms of the Major Crimes Act set
forth above do not apply to prosecutions under the General Crimes Act, many of the criticisms from
the standpoint of constitutional criminal procedure set forth below will apply.

29.

25 u.s.c. § 1302 (2000).
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B. A Practical, Critical Description of the Process
0
of an Indian Country Case3

The FB I has investigative jurisdiction over all the crimes listed in the
3
Major Crimes Act. 1 However, Indian country cases differ in several respects
from most other crimes investigated by the FB I. First, the cases are almost
always reactive. That is, a crime occurs and is then investigated by federal
law enforcement. In most cases, it is a singular event and not part of an on
going criminal enterprise. Few proactive investigations occur in Indian
country. As a result, few sophisticated law enforcement tools are used at the
field level in Indian country. It is exceedingly rare, for example, for Indian
country FB I agents to employ wiretaps, to execute trap and trace or pen reg
ister subpoenas on phone companies, or to work with informants who have
infiltrated a criminal organization. Indeed, undercover operations are espe
cially rare, partially because of the great difficulty outsiders have infiltrating
criminal organizations in Indian communities. With the exception of an oc
casional polygraph exam or DNA or fingerprint analysis, Indian country
cases call on few of the specialized skills of the FB I.
Second, though the offenses are "major" and often tremendously impor
tant in the communities where these crimes occur, almost all of the crimes
are routine, local and simple cases involving violent crimes that, in another
context, would be characterized as "common street crimes" and that would
not be investigated by federal officials but for the Indian country nexus.
Given the FB I's many other responsibilities, such as counterintelligence,
terrorism prevention, and the investigation of other serious offenses, such as
organized crime and complex narcotics conspiracies, Indian country crimes
rarely rank high among the FB I's priorities. As a result, the moniker "major"
is somewhat misleading as an expression of FB I interest and prioritization.
The routine and unsophisticated character of these cases has ramifica
tions at both the organizational and the individual level. At the
organizational level, few FB I agents are assigned to Indian country investi
gations. In contrast to the team approach that prevails in many FB I
30. The authority for this section of the Article, except where otherwise noted, is the author's
own admittedly subjective viewpoint derived from his experience as a federal prosecutor in an In
dian country district and from conversations with other former and current Indian country federal
prosecutors, such as Norman Bay (D.N.M.), Kathleen Bliss (D. Nev.), Chris Chaney (D. Utah), Jeff
Davis (W.D. Mich.), Jonathon Gerson (D.N.M.), Tom Heffelfinger (D. Minn), Diane Humetewa (D.
Ariz.), Joseph Lodge (D. Ariz.), Arvo Mikkanen. (W.D. Okla.), Cliff Wardlaw (D. Minn.), and Sam
Winder (D.N.M.). It also reflects impressions gained from several federal public defenders, such as
John Butcher (D.N.M.), Vito De La Cruz (D. Nev.), Michael Keefe (D.N.M.), John Rhodes (D.
Mont.), and Jon Sands (D. Ariz.). Finally, this section also reflects my impressions gained from
conversations with several FBI agents, such as Special Agent Frank Chimits. While facts were
gleaned from my own experience and each of these conversations, some of the officials named
above would disagree strongly with the conclusions I have drawn. I imply no endorsement.
31.

See U.S. DEP' T OF JUSTIC, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: nTLE 9, CRIMIN AL
§§ 675-76, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/

RESOURCE MANUAL

usam/title9/download.htm [hereinafter U.S. Arr'ys' MANUAL] (setting forth authority for federal
law enforcement in Indian country within Memorandum of Understanding between the United
States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs and the United States Department of
Justice, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation in November 1 993).
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investigations, the agent handling Indian country investigations often works
alone in rural settings and may travel hundreds of miles of reservation roads
in the course of a week's work.3 2 Because of the high caseload that each
agent bears, agents often work together only when crucial to personal
safety.33 As a result, the individual FB I agent may find such work lonely,
dull, or, given the subject matter, even unpleasant.34 To the extent that an
agent does work with another person, it is often a tribal officer.
Most Indian country agents work out of small offices called "resident
agencies" or "R As" which are often staffed with just two or three other
agents in small cities bordering or near Indian reservations.35 An agent
posted at an R A may not have signed up to the FB I expecting to be posted to
such an out-of-the-way location or to be handling the kind of cases that fill
the caseload of the average Indian country special agent, such as sexual
abuse of children. Because Indian country tends not to be a prestigious post
ing, the agents in the R As are often rookies or "first office agents" who seek
transfer as soon as they are eligible, leading to sometimes high turnover
among the FB I personnel dealing with Indian country offenses.36
The law enforcement arm of the Bureau of Indian Affairs also possesses
7
investigative jurisdiction over Indian country offenses.3 Because of the
overlap in investigative jurisdiction with the FB I, B I A patrol officers and
criminal investigators generally handle offenses of less serious magnitude
than the ones handled by the FB I. One key difference between the FB I and
the B I A is that the federal policy of tribal self-governance has taken hold
within the B I A law enforcement program. Through agreements with the
Department of the Interior known as "638 contracts" and "self-governance
32. Over the years, the FBI has begun several initiatives with local tribal law enforcement
agencies to address some of these problems. The current initiative is called the "Safe Trails Task
Forces." Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Indian Country Crime (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/
hq/cid/indian/safetrails.htm.
33. This is obvious from FBI statistics. In the calendar year 2004, approximately JOO FBI
agents worked on Indian country cases nationwide. Collectively, they instituted numerous investiga
tions culminating in approximately 1900 cases. See Grant D. Ashley, Executive Assistant Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the National Native American Law Enforcement Association's
12th Annual Training Conference (Oct. 28, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/ash
ley I02804.htm.
34. Violent crimes investigations sometimes involve blood spatter, collection of semen, and
other "blood and guts type" evidence, or, even worse, difficult social and emotional issues, such as
sex crimes against children.
35. For example, Indian country RAs are located in Flagstaff and Pinetop, Arizona; Bemidji,
Minnesota; Gallup and Farmington, New Mexico; and Vernal and Monticello, Utah, among other
cities. See, e.g., Phoenix Division Regional Offices, http://phoenix.fbi.gov/pxterrit.htm (last visited
Dec. 17, 2005) (listing RAs in the Arizona area).
36. According to federal law enforcement lore, Indian country RAs once served a punitive
role as places to exile FBI agents that fouled up important cases or were otherwise the subject of
disfavor within the Bureau. See infra note 30.
3 7. See 25 U.S.C. § 2803 (2000) (BIA law enforcement authority); see also U.S. ATT'vs'
MANUAL supra note 3 1, §§ 675-76 (including a memorandum of understanding between the United
States Departments of Justice and Interior reaching agreement that each United States Attorney will
prepare local guidelines indicating which law enforcement agency has primary jurisdiction and that
jurisdictional disputes will be resolved, if possible, at the field level).
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compacts,"38 many tribal governments have undertaken the BI A's law en
forcement and investigative responsibilities on their reservations. In
undertaking this responsibility under federal law, a tribal government effec
tively substitutes its own tribal police for BIA law enforcement (just as BI A
3
law enforcement once supplanted tribal law enforcement institutions). 9
Since investigation precedes a criminal prosecution, the "devolution" to
tribes of this important function can give tribal law enforcement a key role
in criminal cases. As a result, in some cases involving less serious felony
offenses, tribal police will work directly with federal prosecutors.
Because authority for investigation of such crimes overlaps between in
0
dependent law enforcement agencies, jurisdictional disputes can develop.4
Often, uniformed BI A or tribal police arrive on the scene first. The overlap
in the jurisdictional roles of the FBI and BIA, while sometimes leading to
conflict, has some advantages to the community in that one agency can in
vestigate even if another declines to do so.41
Because alcohol is involved in a substantial number of the crimes in In
dian country,42 many cases are not difficult to solve. Suspects rarely employ
sophisticated strategies for covering their tracks. Often the perpetrator is
known and the most difficult challenge is to locate him and make an arrest.
On rural parts of reservations that are accessed by dirt roads without street
signs or visible addresses on the homes, however, effective investigation
38. See 25 U.S.C. § 450(1) (Supp. V 1 975) and 25 C.F.R. § 27 1 ( 1 996). Although neither
BIA officials nor the tribes were particularly happy with practical implementation of the 638 con
tract program, the regime was hampered by the Byzantine bureaucracy of the BIA, which
compartmentalized functions in a manner that frustrated flexibility among those providing services.
See Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to
Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1 25 1 , 1 264-66 ( 1 995).
39.
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2804(f) (2000) (recognizing that tribal law enforcement officers
possess the status of federal officers for certain purposes when working under a 638 contract for law
enforcement); see also WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 20-2 1 ( 1 966) (describing
various traditional tribal law enforcement institutions such as the Cherokee Lighthorsemen).
40.

HAGAN, supra

note 39, at 20-22.

Investigative decisions by Tribal or BIA law enforcement officials not to i nvestigate or
41.
not to refer a case for prosecution are not decisive because the FBI may independently investigate
and make its own referral if it deems appropriate. See U.S. Arr'vs' MANUAL, supra note 3 1 ,
§ § 675-76 (including memorandum indicating that tribal or Interior law enforcement must notify
the FBI of any decision to decline to investigate a criminal matter falling within the investigative
authority of either agency). Likewise, investigative decisions by tribal law enforcement officials to
investigate and refer a case are reviewed by a United States Attorney who can, of course, decline to
prosecute. Id.
42. See Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from Two
Young Lives in Indian Country, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2 1 33, 2 145, 2 1 54 (2005) (noting "oppressive
force of alcohol in the Native community"); Kathy Helms, Navajo Nation No.I in Crime, INDEP.
(Gallup, N.M.), Nov. 1 , 2004, at 2 (quoting Assistant United States Attorney Diane Humetewa,
"Ninety-nine percent of the cases referred to [the Arizona United States Attorney's Office] involve
alcohol or substance abuse . . . ."); see also LAWRENCE PIERSOL ET AL., U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE NATIVE AMERICAN ADVISORY GROUP 35 (2003), available at http://www. ussc.gov/
NAAG/NativeAmer.pdf ("Across the board, alcohol plays a significant role in all violent crime
arising in Indian country."); STEWART WAKELING ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICING ON
AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 19 (2001 ) (noting that alcohol-related crime is the leading crime
problem in Indian country and explaining the repeated citation of alcohol abuse as a challenge fac
ing Indian policing and Indian communities in general).
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may require significant local knowledge of homes and other locations. It
may also require some knowledge of family ties and social networks in the
community. Because Indian communities are often relatively closed to
strangers, federal law enforcement officers such as FB I agents face a sig
nificant handicap and often find themselves at the mercy of tribal officers.
Indeed, a tribal police officer that lives in a community is almost certain to
have stronger contacts and may very well be able to produce information in
an investigation that a federal agent would never discover. As a result, fed
eral agents often develop close working relationships with tribal officers.
After the arrest, federal officers are likely to extract a confession. Con
fessions seem far more common in federal Indian country cases than in
other federal cases, such as narcotics cases. While the relative lack of so
phistication of the criminal defendant and the strength of the evidence may
occasionally work to help the FB I agent extract a confession, at least one
commentator has speculated that the tribal values of honesty and of being
forthright in accepting responsibility for one's actions that disrupted the
3
community may also play a role. 4
Once the perpetrator is found (sometimes in tribal custody), federal
agents must make the arrest (or take custody) and take the perpetrator before
a United States Magistrate Judge for an initial appearance. Because the
cases tend to be reactive, it is often at the time of the arrest, or only shortly
before, that the United States Attorney's Office first learns of the offense.
The first substantive prosecutorial step in a federal major crimes case is
review of the evidence and the determination of whether or not to pursue a
prosecution. Following the arrest, federal prosecutors work with the arrest
ing officer to prepare a criminal complaint or else direct that the perpetrator
be released. If the United States Attorney's Office ( "U S AO") decides to pro
ceed, it will file a criminal complaint. The perpetrator will then be taken to
the nearest federal court for an initial appearance. During that appearance,
4
the federal prosecutor may file a motion for a detention hearing. 4 If so, the
defendant is "bound over" and remains in custody pending the hearing.
If the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed to represent
him in later proceedings. A substantial number of Indian country defendants
are indigent and are represented by the Federal Public Defender or, if that
office is unavailable or has a conflict, an attorney selected by the court from
a panel of attorneys on a court-approved list of criminal defense attorneys
who are willing to take cases under the court's modest fee structure.
The defense attorney will face several obstacles that may make it diffi
cult to provide effective representation. At the outset, the defense attorney

43.
Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2 1 56 ("[T]here is a socialization to accountability that oper
ates in indigenous societies that is not necessarily compatible with the underlying principles of
American criminal law . . . . ).
"

44. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 142(f)(2). A handful of federal districts with substantial Indian reserva
tion lands have part-time magistrate judges who sit in smaller cities close to Indian reservations who
serve no other purpose but to preside over initial appearances so that a perpetrator may be bound
over for a detention hearing.
.
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may need an interpreter to communicate with the defendant45 and may face
significant cultural hurdles in developing a trusting relationship. With lim
ited resources, the defense attorney may have difficulty investigating a crime
that occurred a great distance from the court (and the defender's urban of
fice). Hours of investigative work may be consumed in traveling to and from
the reservation to search for and interview witnesses. The defense team may
not have the resources to send an investigator on numerous trips to the res
ervation. In this respect, there may be striking asymmetry between the
prosecutors who use agents relatively close to the reservation and defense
attorneys who lack "resident agency" offices for their investigators.
Once a defendant has been charged, and following the initial appear
ance, a defendant commonly appears before a United States Magistrate
Judge for an arraignment and, if the United States seeks to hold the defen
dant in custody pending trial, a detention hearing. 46 At these preliminary
stages, the court fills two primary roles. The court identifies the charges that
the defendant faces and formally advises the defendant of his key procedural
rights. The second role is risk assessment: the court must measure the likeli
hood that the defendant will flee or otherwise fail to appear at future
proceedings, and determine whether release of the defendant "will endanger
the safety of any other person or the community."47
The magistrate judge who must make these evaluations is almost certain
to be a non- Indian who lacks any particular familiarity with the Indian
community where the defendant was arrested. Moreover, if the court lies at
a great distance from the community where the crime occurred, it may be
difficult for the defendant and his attorney to locate and present witnesses
who can assist the defendant in contesting detention. Often a defendant will
meet his attorney only a short time before the arraignment and detention
hearing. Even outside Indian country, such hearings often occur with imper
fect and incomplete information. In the Indian country context, reliable
information and witnesses are likely to be even more difficult to obtain.
In the federal system, no felony prosecution, including those for major
crimes in Indian country, may proceed without an indictment issued by a
8
grand jury. 4 Thus, whether or not the defendant is held in detention, the

45. Federal courts certify Navajo interpreters. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating lin
guistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of language Rights in the United States, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV . 1 33, 20 1 n.255 (200 1 ). However, some tribal courts routinely proceed in
their own native languages, other than Navajo, such as Lakota. See, e.g., FRANK POMMERSHEIM,
BRAID OF FEATHERS 69-70 ( 1 995). This suggests that some federal Indian defendants other than
Navajos might also benefit from official interpreters.

46.

See 1 8 U.S.C. § 3 1 42 (2000);

47.

1 8 U.S.C. § 3 1 42(c) (2000).

FED.

R. CRIM. P. 5(a).

48. The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right to an indictment: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This guarantee is incorporated into Rule
6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the method for constituting a grand
jury and applicable rules, such as the rule of secrecy. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(3)(1 ). However, a criminal
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United States Atto rney must next present an indictment to the grand jury or
risk having the case dismissed.49 A federal grand jury consists of up to
twenty-three citizens selected randomly to serve for a lengthy term-often
50
one year, though a longer time is authorized. Grand jurors screen and
evaluate prosecutorial charging decisions by ensuring that the evidence pre
sented by the prosecutor is sufficient to meet a legal standard of probable
cause. Though the American criminal justice system uses a grand jury for
this function primarily to ensure that the community has a role in the ad
ministration of criminal justice, f ew or none of the grand jurors in most
Indian country cases actually reside in any Indian country community.51
As an empirical matter, grand juries usually issue the indictments that
f ederal prosecutors seek.52 Once the indictment is issued, the defendant will
be arraigned again on the indictment. The defendant, in consultation with
his atto rney and in negotiations with federal prosecutors, will decide
whether to plead guilty or go to trial. If the defendant chooses to go to trial,
witnesses must be found and served with subpoenas ; they will be required to
travel to federal court to testify and may be required to wait around a day or
two to testify, depending on the pace of the trial.
For reasons that will be addressed fully below,53 the venire from which
the jury is selected is unlikely to have a single member of the Indian com
munity in which the crime occurred. At trial, neither the prosecutor, the
defense attorney, the marshals, nor the court security officers, the court re
porter, the judge, or law clerks are likely to live within the community
where the offense occurred. In many cases, the only other tribal member in
the courtroom will be the interpreter,54 if one is needed, and the witnesses. In

defendant who cooperates may waive indictment and allow the United States to proceed on the basis
of an information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b).
49.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).

50.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a), (g). The federal grand jury in districts with large numbers of major
crimes prosecutions typically meets for one to three days on a monthly or semiweekly basis.
51.

For a discussion of Indian representation on juries, see infra Section III.B-C.

52.
Lawyers and scholars tend to be skeptical of the importance of the modem grand jury's
screening power. Many believe that grand jury review represents, at best, "a modest screening
power, a fact recognized by the familiar courthouse saying that a grand jury would indict a ham
sandwich if the prosecutor asked it to do so." Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screen
ing/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 5 1 n.70 (2002) (citing R. Michael Cassidy, Toward a

More Independent Grand Jury: Recasting and Enforcing the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpa
tory Evidence, 1 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, 3 6 1 , 36 1 (2000)).
53.

See infra Section III.B-C.

54.

See Christopher Chaney, Victim Rights in Indian Country-An Assistant United States
Attorney Perspective, U.S. ATT'Ys' BULL., Jan. 2003 at 36 (noting use of a Navajo/English language
translator for a nineteen-year-old witness in a typical, though fictional, case). The courts largely
need interpreters not for the witnesses and the defendant, but for the judge, the jury, the prosecutor,
the defender, and for purposes of creating a written record. In other words, the interpreter is needed
for reasons external to the community and precisely because the community's language is not ade
quate for purposes of the federal court. The need for a translator is thus emblematic of the colonial
nature of the system; it is designed to inflict an external justice system on communities that have
existed in the same locale since before English was spoken.
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that s ens e, the tribu nal may s eem ali en to th e defe nda nt , a nd he may not fe el
that he is b ei ng ju dg ed i n a ny s ens e by his ow n c ommu nity.
I f th e defe nda nt pl ea ds guilty or is c onvicted at trial , h e will pr oc eed t o
s ent enci ng b efor e a fe deral ju dg e. Th e fe deral ju dg e g enerally will not b e
accust om ed t o s eei ng th e ki nd o f off ens es at issu e i n th e case, exc ept i n I n
dia n c ou ntry cas es. B ecause h e has littl e exp eri enc e with similar off ens es
that occur outside th e r es ervati on a nd ar e thus ha ndl ed r outi nely i n stat e
c ourts , th e ju dg e may w ell hav e a s kew ed vi ew of th e I ndia n c ommu nity
wh er e th e crim e occurr ed.
At s ent enci ng , th e defe nda nt will b e s ent enc ed i n acc or da nc e with the
fe deral s ent enci ng gui deli nes a nd other fe deral laws , i nclu di ng ma ndat ory
mi nimum s ent enc es for certai n crimes . As a practical matt er, neith er Congr ess
nor the U. S. S ent enci ng C ommissi on have c onsi der ed th e particular eff ect of
ss
the s ent enc es on I ndia n c ommu niti es or I ndia n c ou ntry defe nda nts. As a
r esult , th e s ent enc es may w ell b e substa ntially l ong er than the av erage s en
s
t enc e for a similar off ens e i n stat e c ourt. 6 M or eov er , th ough the defe nda nt's
crimi nal r ec or d i n federal or state c ourts will b e used t o calculat e his crimi
nal hist ory for purp os es of calculati ng th e l ength of his s ent enc e, federal
s7
c ourts usually ig nore th e defe nda nt's crimi nal r ec or ds fr om tribal c ourts.
O nc e th e s ent enc e is pr onou nc ed, th e fe deral Bur eau of Pris ons will as
sig n th e defe nda nt t o a particular pris on. Th e pris on is li kely t o b e l ocated i n
ss
a diff er ent stat e tha n wh er e th e off ens e occurr ed. This gr eat er r elativ e dis
ta nc e is li kely t o ma ke it much m or e di fficult for th e defenda nt's chil dr en
a nd oth er family m emb ers t o visit him , a pr obl em exac erbated by th e pr e
vaili ng p ov erty am ong I ndia n famili es. Th e defe nda nt thus may b ec om e
ali enat ed fr om his family a nd depriv ed of em oti onal supp ort that oth erwis e
might hav e h elped him survive i ncarc erati on a nd achi ev e s om e m easur e of
r ehabilitati on.

55.
PIERSOL, supra note 42; see also Native Am. Advisory Group, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n,
Transcript of Public Hearing at the Judicial Conference Center (Nov. 4, 2003),
http://www.ussc.gov/NAAG/NAAGhear.pdf [hereinafter Transcript].
56. See Transcript, supra note 55. The amount of the disparity depends, of course, on the
state in which the offense occurred.
57. See Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Courts and Federal Sentencing, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 403,
4 1 4- 1 7 (2004); see also Kevin Washburn, Reconsidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal
Courts, 1 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 209, 209 (2005); Jon M. Sands & Jane McClellan, Commentary, Pol
icy Meets Practice: Why Tribal Convictions Should not be Counted, 1 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 2 1 5
(2005); Bruce D . Black, Commentary o n Reconsidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal
Courts, 1 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 2 1 8 (2005); William C. Canby, Jr., Commentary, Treatment of Tribal
Court Convictions, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 220 (2005); Charles Kornmann, Commentary on Recon
sidering the Commission 's Treatment of Tribal Courts, 1 7 FED. SENT'G REP. 222 (2005).
58. The problem is exacerbated by Federal B ureau of Prisons policy. For more than a dec
ade, the only substantial sex offender treatment program within the federal prisons was in Butner,
North Carolina, which is more than 1 700 miles from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and more than
1 800 miles from Rapid City, South Dakota. As a result, federal defendants had to make an unfortu
nate choice between living near family and obtaining treatment. See MAGDELINE JENSEN ET AL.,
FINAL REPORT OF THE SEXUAL OFFENSES SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING

AD HOC ADVISORY GROUP, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (2003) (on file with author).
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I I. FEDERAL PROSECUTORS IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Because the prosecutor is, in many respects, the single most important
actor in a federal Indian country case ,59 an examination of the role of the
prosecutor is a useful place to begin a critical examination of federal Indian
country prosecutions. The prosecution and imprisonment of an Indian for an
on -reservation crime against another Indian is perhaps the single most ag
gressive use of federal power against an Indian that routinely occurs, at least
in mode m times, and thus may be one of the greatest existing intrusions on
internal tribal affairs. I will address three different types of problems created
by the use of federal prosecutors in Indian country. The first set of problems
relates to the intersection between community values, prosecutorial discre
tion, and prosecutorial accountability. The second major problem is a
practical political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry effect."
And, finally, the third is a tribal govern ance issue that stems partially from
the previous problems.
A. Community Values and the Foundation of Prosecutorial Discretion
and Prosecutorial Accountability

In the American criminal justice system, the prosecutor "is the represen
tative of the public in whom is lodged a discretion " to review the evidence
60
and determ ine whether or not to bring criminal charges. In the United
States, the power of prosecutors is routinely characteri zed as "tremendous "6 1
2
and the prosecutor's discretion is described as "virtually unlimited."6 Prose
cutorial discretion begins with the decision to charge the defendant, a most
important power, but it actually extends to numerous decisions made
throughout a federal case, such as which charges to include, whether to see k
to have the defendant held in custody pending trial, whether to offer alterna
tive sanctions such as pretrial diversion, whether to accept a guilty plea to

59. Mandatory minimum sentences and the overwhelming prevalence of plea bargains have
arguably made federal prosecutors more powerful than judges; once the prosecutor decides which
offense to charge, the prosecutor has, in effect, locked in a very narrow range of discretion for the
judge in deciding the sentence. See Albert W. Alschuler, Monarch, Lackey, or Judge, 64 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 723 ( 1 993). While a jury could conceivably exercise discretion over the prosecutor's charging
decision by, for example, convicting on a lesser-included offense, juries are not informed about
mandatory minimum sentences or about the power of nullification. Moreover, juries are absent in
the overwhelming majority of cases that are resolved through plea bargains. See Stephanos Bibas,
Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 1 1 0 YALE L.J. 1 097,
1 149-50 (200 1 ) (noting that only 4% of adjudicated felons have jury trials, and 5 % have bench
trials, while 91 % plea bargain).
60. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 1 67, 192 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (quot
ing United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 1 00, IOI (S.D. Ill. 1 945)).
61 .
( 1 940).

Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 1 8, 1 8- 1 9

62. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 5 2 1 ,
1 525 ( 1 98 1 ); see also James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials,
1 976 DUKE L.J. 65 1 , 678 ("The prosecutor's decision whether and what to charge is the broadest
discretionary power in criminal [justice] administration.").
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less than all of the offenses charged , and whether to seek sentencing en
hancements.63
While the decision to prosecute for a specific offense is reviewable , to
64
some degree , by the grand jury, decisions not to bring a case or to "under 
charge" are entirely unreviewable.65 As Kenneth Culp Davis has recognized ,
"the a ffirmative power to prosecute is enormous , but the negative power to
withhold prosecution may be even greater , because it is less protected
66
against abuse."
As a practical matter , it is incorrect to say that federal prosecutorial dis
cretion is entirely unbounded. Federal prosecutors are guided both by
general and specific directions set forth in the Dnited States Attorney's
67
Manual , which apply nationwide. Federal prosecutors generally also pos
sess district-specific guidelines , written and unwritten ,68 that inform
decisions about which cases to prosecute.69 The local prosecutorial guide
lines , which describe threshold facts that must exist to warrant consideration
of the case for prosecution , are routinely shared with law enforcement agen 
70
cies to assist agents in determining how to prioritize their investigations.
Those United States Attorneys with Indian country criminal jurisdiction of
ten spell out specific guidelines for the offenses enumerated in the Major
Crimes Act. These local guidelines are generally not binding ; they exist en
tirely as a matter of discretion and therefore need not be strictly followed by
the prosecutors who rely on them. It is thus unclear how much effect the
federal prosecutorial guidelines have on prosecutorial behavior.

63.
See, e.g., Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. C HI. L. R EV .
427, 428 ( 1 960).
64.

See supra notes 48-5 1 and accompanying text (discussing the grand jury).

See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO S T. L.J. 1 325,
1 337 ( 1 993); see also Patrick Halligan, A Political Economy of Prosecutorial Discretion, 5 AM. J.
65.

CRIM. L. 2, 6 ( 1 977) (noting that the discretion to prosecute is limited to some degree by equal pro
tection guarantees, but that the discretion not to prosecute is limitless).
66.

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:

A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 1 88 ( 1 969).

U.S. Arr Ys MANUAL, supra note 3 1 , §§ 675-76; see also Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
67.
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837; Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 893, 934-36 (2000).
'

'

68. See, e.g. , Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantita
tive Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. C HI. L. REV. 246 ( 1 980).
69.
U.S. Arr'ys' MANUAL, supra note 3 1 , § 9-27.230(8)( 1 ) (setting forth the Principles of
Federal Prosecution).
70. For example, the United States Attorney's Prosecutive Guidelines for the District of New
Mexico in force in 1 997 provided that it would "accept any prosecutable cases which affect inter
state commerce and which involve death or serious bodily injury. In all other cases there must be a
provable interstate commerce nexus and the property damage must be over $ I 0,000." Memorandum
from U.S. Att'y to Special Agent in Charge, Regarding Prosecutive Guidelines for Matters Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States Attorney's Office, District of New Mexico 3 (Apr. 1 8, 1 997) (on
file with author). This guideline for arson is not unusual in that it leaves a large gray area; it does not
necessarily indicate that the office will accept prosecution of cases involving greater than a $ 1 0,000
loss that do not involve a dwelling or danger to human life. Id.
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Even where prose cutors purport to be followin g obje ctive guidelines,
they nevertheless have tremendous latitude be cause they must also make an
independent and hi ghly subje ctive jud gment about the suffi cien cy of evi
den ce to brin g a case. In other words, even where the alle ged fa cts clearly
meet the guidelines, a prose cutor may well de cide that the alle ged fa cts can
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Su ch de cisions are notoriously
diffi cult to se cond -guess, and no other institutional a ctor has constitutional
.
7
stand mg to do so. 1
The tremendous breadth of prose cutorial dis cretion has been justified on
a number of grounds. First, courts have re gularly noted the pra cti cal diffi
7
culty in reviewin g su ch de cisions. 2 Such de cisions are based on all sorts of
reasons, such as allo cation of prose cutorial and investi gative resour ces, law
en for cement priorities, and subje ctive assessments of evidence and guilt.
And few of these reasons are set forth in a written re cord that make them
amenable to judi cial review. Se cond, there are stron g institutional con cerns
for preservin g separation of powers between the judi cial and exe cutive
73
bran ches of government. Third , prose cutors must retain broad dis cretion in
a world in whi ch they simply cannot enfor ce all of the criminal laws on the
7
books. 4 In addition to these pra cti cal justifi cations, broad prose cutorial dis
cretion has been normatively justified by the premise that prose cutors take
into a ccount and indeed internalize the community's values and mores in
determinin g whi ch cases to prose cute. .In other words, we trust prose cutors
with broad power pre cisely be cause we expe ct them to exer cise that power
in a manner consistent with the needs of the community. Indeed, in the
Ameri can system, in whi ch many prose cutors announ ce their appearan ce in
court by claimin g that they represent "the people," the prose cutor is imbued
7
with an almost moral authority that trans cends mere governmental power. 5

7 1 . See, e.g. , Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 48 1 -82 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that
the prosecutor must consider "[m]yriad factors" and "no court has any jurisdiction to inquire into or
review his decision").
72. See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 ( 1 985) ("[B]road discretion rests
largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute [is based on a variety of factors and] is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.").
73.

United States v. Armstrong, 5 1 7 U.S. 456, 464 (1996).

74.
DAVIS, supra note 66, at 1 92-93 (recognizing the nearly universal view that the prosecut
ing power intrinsically involves broad discretion because not all laws can be enforced, prosecution
involves interpretation of statutes that are inherently uncertain, and the prosecutor must exercise
discretion in determining whether evidence is sufficient); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note
67, at 899 n.206 ("[R]esource constraints prevent universal prosecution and incarceration of all . . .
who technically . . . violate[] the law.").
75.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 ( 1 935), provides the most well-known expression of this moral authority:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obliga
tion to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that i t
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. A s such, h e is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno
cence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty
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This moral and legal authority to act on behalf of the community is rein
forced by the fact that most prosecutors are local officials entrusted by the
community to perform this important function .76 The premise that the prose
cutor acts with community values in mind is suppo rted, in most non-federal
77
American jurisdictions, by strong political checks on prosecutorial abuses.
The chief prosecutor in most American ju risdictions is elected. Public ac
countability arises from the notion that "prosecutors are . . . likely to satisfy
the public's desires if their decisions have some implications for thei r ca
reers."78 The political checks include direct control through election of
prosecutors (or those who appoint them), to serve limited terms (in contrast
to, for example, federal judges who have life tenure ), and indi rect control
7
through appropriations and other legislative decisions. 9 It also presumably
includes indirect and ·informal checks such as media attention and popular
opinion.
Even in the federal system , where prosecutors are appointed by the
80
President and thus are insulated to a greater degree from electoral politics,
the basic organi zational scheme nevertheless reflects a preference for local
control and the notion that a local prosecutor can better reflect local com
munity values. Then-Attorney General, later Justice, Robert Jackson
recogni zed that even federal prosecutors should be responsive to community
values and sentiments when he recogni zed that "the moral climate of the
United States is as varied as its physical climate," and thus even federal
prosecutors "could hardly adopt strict standards for loose states or loose
standards for strict states without doing violence to local sentiment."81 In
keeping with this admonition, federal prosecutors presumably endeavor to
exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with community values.
As a local official, the federal prosecutor is in many ways little different
from the state prosecutor ; she is a member of the community, at least in
some broad sense, for which she is prosecuting offenses and her authority

to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongfui conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
76.
( 1 999).

See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 337; see also

WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH

77.
See Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 337-38, 1 342 (noting the political controls on prosecutors
and even those appointed as federal prosecutors by the President); see also William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 1 07 YALE L.J. 1 , 22 ( 1 997)
("On the government's side, prosecutors are bureaucrats; like other bureaucrats, their activity level is
largely governed by their budgets. Rationing i n this setting is akin to queuing, albeit in a system
where the prosecutor defines one's place in line.").
78.

Green & Zacharias, supra note 67.

79. See Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
321 , 327 (2002) ("In a world of limited resources, prosecutors must act in accordance with the pri
orities of their funding authorities.").
80.
Frase, supra note 68, at 249 ( (T]he federal prosecutor is not an elected official, and is
not subject to popular political pressures, although he may be removed by the President.").
"

81.

Jackson, supra note 6 1 , at 20.
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82
der ives normat ively fr om her represe ntat ion of that commu nity. I n that re
spe ct, the only real d iffere nce, for m ost offe nses, is that the f ederal
pr ose cut or 's " commu nity" is s imply a larger d istr ict tha n the state prose cu
t or's commu nity a nd the range of pr ose cutable offe nses is m ore narr ow.
Thus, it is easy for the federal pr ose cut or t o exer cise h is auth or ity in a ma n
ner cons iste nt w ith commu nity m ores if he s o ch ooses. I n m ost
cir cumsta nces, he presumably ca n intu it them alm ost as well as a state
pr ose cut or ca n.
B. The Federal Prosecutor in Indian Country
A n impl icit just ifi cat ion for the m odern federal I nd ian cou ntry cr im inal
just ice reg ime is that the U nited States has a resp ons ib il ity t o preserve pub
l ic safety on I nd ia n reservat ions.83 I ndeed, the reg ime d oes not purp ort t o be
pr imar ily resp ons ible for public safety thr ough out the ge neral commu nity
e ncompass ing the e nt ire federal jud icial d istr ict or state but merely concer ns
th ose commu nit ies that l ie w ithin the jur isd ict ional confi nes of " I nd ia n
cou ntry," as that term is defi ned in the U nited States C ode. I n other w ords,
the reg ime is des ig ned t o pr ov ide publ ic safety a nd cr im inal just ice in I nd ia n
cou ntry and the statutory s cheme is ge ograph ically defi ned as apply ing only
84
t o that area. Give n that ba ckgr ou nd, the appare nt resp ons ib il ity of the
pr ose cut or in a n I nd ian cou ntry case is t o represe nt-a nd pr ote ct-the I n
d ia n cou ntry commu nity.85
1. The Prosecutor as Representative of the Community

F or a var iety of reas ons, one m ight be h ighly skept ical of the ab il ity of a
f ederal pr ose cut or t o represe nt the I nd ia n cou ntry commu nity. U nl ike the
usual cir cumsta nces, in wh ich the pr ose cut or internal izes and a cts in a ccor
dan ce w ith the m ores and values of the community ( of wh ich she
the oret ically is a part), a f ederal pr osecutor in I nd ia n cou ntry may l ive hu n
dreds of m iles fr om the reservation and may not eve n speak the la nguage
used in that commu nity. She may not be able t o u nderstand a nd internal ize
the values of the commu nity that she the oret ically pr ote cts.

82.
See generally JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS
IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS ( 1 978); WHITNEY NORTH SEYMOUR, JR., UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY: AN INSIDE VIEW OF "JUSTICE" IN AMERICA UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
( 1 975).
83. See Contemporary Tribal Governments: Challenges in Law Enforcement Related to the
Rulings of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 1 07th
Cong. 9-1 1 (2002) (statement of Thomas B. Heffelfinger, U.S. Att'y for the Dist. of Minn.), avail
able at http://Indian.senate.gov/2002hrgs/07 1 1 02hrg/heffelfinger.pdf ("Since 1 885, when Congress
passed the Major Crimes Act, United States Attorneys have had primary responsibility for the prose
cution of serious violent crime in Indian country." (citation omitted)).
84.

See supra note 2 1 and accompanying text.

85. Thus, the Indian country case stands in contrast to the normal situation i n which "the
prosecutor's client is the [general] public." See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 866 n . 106.
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The federal prosecutor 's lack of membership in the Indian country
community is not the only obstacle she will face in intuiting community
values. First, she is not present on a daily basis within the community to
participate in ongoing communications about community values and mores.
She will not know, firsthand, what the community is talking about or con
cerned about. Second, since many Indian communities are closed and
suspicious of outsiders, it is unrealistic to belie ve that they will easily con
fide in a federal prosecutor about matters that are important to them.
This critique, at first blush, may not seem to be limited to Indian country
cases. Admittedly, a federal judicial district is composed of numerous het
erogeneous "communities," and members of many communities, especially
the minority communities within the jurisdiction, might feel that the local
prosecutors do not internalize their values and thus do not "represent" them.
An African American community, for example, may feel that prosecutors
are un fairly targeting it. While Indian country communities ha ve a some
what stronger claim because of the explicitly geographical jurisdictional
grant, it is important to remember Felix Cohen 's famous metaphor of Indi
ans as the "miner's canary" with the treatment of Indians reflecting the
health of American policy and democratic values beyond Indian policy.86
The Indian country regime, in explicitly creating a scheme for prosecut
ing local offenses with no national nexus and applying only to Indian
country, offers insight into our national psyche.87 While federal law may not
consciously single out African American communities, its willingness to
single out "Indian country" for special treatment in this way may be cause
for broader concerns by other communities. In Indian country, the federal
prosecutor is alien to the community and less able or unable to understand,
internalize and protect, or e ven act in accordance with, the commun ity 's
values. Perhaps such an official simply is not institutionally competent. This
gi ves rise to a related problem.
2. The A ccountability Problem

The alignment between the prosecutor and community values that ser ves
as the normati ve foundation for broad prosecutorial discretion is supported,
in most American jurisdictions, by prosecutorial accountability through the
political process. The crimes enumerated and prosecuted under the federal
Indian country regime are crimes that Roscoe Pound would ha ve character
ized as crimes against "local order."88 Outside of Indian country, such crimes
are routinely prosecuted by local (state) prosecutors elected by the local

86.
1982).

FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, at v (Rennard Strickland ed.,

87. While some of my criticisms might also apply to certain federal enclaves such as military
bases, application of federal rules on federal enclaves does not have the same ramifications as fed
eral rules on Indian reservations where, presumably, an existing community has addressed such
issues since time immemorial.
88.

ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 1 5 1 ( 1 930).
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commu nity or county in which the crime occurred 89
. I ndeed, one of the
commo n qu alific atio ns of st anding for electio n as a st ate or loc al prosecutor
9()
is residency within the jurisdiction . Thus , in theory, the elected prosecutor
is not o nly an elected age nt of the people but almost alw ays is also a mem
ber of the com mu nity i n which the crime occurred.91
Thou gh prosecutors are represe nt atives of the public, prosecutors h ave
their ow n person al i nterests i n decidi ng which c ases to prosecute. M any
com me nt ators h ave noted wh at mi ght collectively be c alled " age ncy prob
lems "92 th at prevent perfect ali gnment of the i nterests of the prosecutors and
the public. For re aso ns discussed immedi ately here and above , these
" age ncy problems " are f ar more severe i n Indi an country. At the other e nd of
the spectrum, some schol ars h ave expressed appropri ate concern about
prosecutors who are too account able to the commu nity.93 Others h ave ex
pressed the notion th at the account ability question is more complex th an it
seems. 94 Prosecutors m ay seek to vi ndic ate community v alues th at are re
flected i n l aws or they m ay seek to vi ndic ate commu nity v alues th at are
i nfl amed i n a p articul ar e gre gious c ase. Most comme nt ators would agree
th at prosecutors should resist the "mome nt ary hue and cry " of the public in
a "he ated mome nt " and rem ai n true i nste ad to the public will in a more ge n
er al sense as "expressed over time in the l aw and popul ar culture. "95
However, such deb ates are e ntirely ac ademic for I ndi an tribes.
Feder al I ndi an cou ntry prosecutors are less likely to feel any pressure to
be accou nt able to either type of .com mu nity will. The politic al power of In
di an trib al com mu nities over their (feder al) prosecutors is strikin gly
differe nt from the politic al power over the prosecutors who brin g the s ame
kind of c ases i n no n-I ndi an commu nities. Bec ause feder al prosecutors are
appoi nted, r ather th an elected , direct politic al account ability is absent in all
I ndi an cou ntry c ases, i ncre asing the gulf between the interests of the prose
cutors and the commu nity.

89.
Cf Pizzi, supra note 65, at 1 338 (noting that state prosecutors are almost always elected
officials).
90. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 9, § 2 1 5.2 (West 2000) ("The district attorney shall
reside in the county from which he was elected during his term of office.").
9 1 . See generally Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 Ctt1.-KENT L. REV. 605, 643-52 ( 1 998) (asserting that prosecutors are, in
general, representative of their communities).
92. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 85 1 , 865 ( 1 995); Ted
Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 5354 ( 1 996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, IOI YALE L.J. 1 979, 1987-88
( 1 992).
93.

DAVIS, supra note 66.

94.

See Green & Zacharias, supra note 67, at 870 n . 1 1 6.

95.

Id. at 870.
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That is not to say that federal prosecutors are dea f to popular opinion on
Indian reservations.96 To the extent that prosecutors are attuned to commu
nity concerns , though , Indians have the additional problem o f dilution.
External motivations , such as the media attention that comes with a high
profile case , are also problematic.97 Indian country cases rarely obtain much
media exposure.98 From the federal prosecutor's perspective , an urban or
suburban bank robbery may very well obtain greater and more sustained
media attention than a multiple homicide on a rural Indian reser vation.
Some federal Indian country prosecutors undertake extraordinary for
mal99 and in formal '00 efforts to get to know their Indian communities. Such
knowledge is absolutely crucial to the task. One federal prosecutor has ex
plained , for example , the Navajo cultural no rm against loo king a person in
the eye , which can be considered "offensive , an affront , even a challenge to

96. Indeed, Professor Frase's assertion that a federal prosecutor "is not subject to popular
political pressures" because "[he] is not an elected official" is true as a fonnal matter, but it can be
qualified. Frase, supra note 68, at 249; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. A practical,
albeit indirect, constraint on United States Attorneys is the fact that many such officials expect to
seek other appointed or elected office in the future. See, e.g. , Dan M. Kahan, ls Chevron Relevant to
Federal Criminal Law?, 1 1 0 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486 ( 1 996) ("U.S. Attorneys are extraordinarily
ambitious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving office."). Though political ambition
likely increases accountability, it does so only marginally with regard to Indian tribes. The reserva
tion communities are just one of many constituent groups and may be the smallest and poorest such
groups at that. Each Indian community is only one of many constituencies of a United States Attor
ney, and often a small, distant, and poor constituency. And Indian communities, like most poor and
undereducated communities, are notorious for not voting. However, this appears to be changing.
See, e.g., John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in Ameri
can Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, JO KAN. J.L. & Pus. Pot.' Y 533 (2001 ).
97. See Simons, supra note 67, at 932 ("[There is a] common . . . desire of prosecutors to
prosecute highly publicized cases.").
98. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme Court Justice & "Boring " Cases, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 401 ,
403 (200 1 ) (noting that Justice Brennan once referred to an Indian law case as a "chicken-shit" case).
99. Most United States Attorney's Offices in states with Indian country jurisdiction have
explicitly designated an Assistant United States Attorney as a liaison to the Indian tribes within the
jurisdiction. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, OJP Resources for Indian Country, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
americannative/attysoffices.htm (last visited Dec. 1 7, 2005). The tribal liaison positions are some
what political in nature, that is, the liaison is assigned a relationship with the tribal government,
rather than the tribal community at large. Moreover, in some districts, the USAOs designate a civil
attorney rather than a prosecutor as the liaison to avoid any awkwardness for a liaison serving a role
as prosecutor and also fielding tribal complaints about prosecutions involving tribal members. Fed
eral prosecutors are authorized, though not required, by federal law to report the declination of an
Indian country prosecution to the appropriate Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2809(b) (2000).
JOO.
Following an outbreak of violence on the Red Lake Chippewa Indian reservation in
Minnesota, the United States Attorney in Minnesota publicly said that he was redoubling federal
efforts to address violent crime on that reservation. See Margaret Zack, State-Federal Project
Fights Reservation Violent Crime, STAR Turn. (Minneapolis), Aug. 30, 2002, at 2B (noting that
the Red Lake Reservation, with a population of 5000, had five homicides during a nine-month
period beginning in late 2001 ). Among other efforts to reach out to the community, the United
States Attorney attended the final game of a 2003 state high school basketball tournament to
cheer for a high school team from the Red Lake Chippewa Indian Reservation. Conversation with
Tom Heffelfinger, June 2003, notes on file with author. Such actions are commendable; they are
not necessarily the norm. The Red Lake school shooting case in March 2005, which cost ten lives
and resulted in a federal juvenile prosecution, dealt a serious blow to federal efforts to improve
crime statistics on that reservation.
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0
the othe r pe rson."1 1 Knowled ge of and respect for such a cultu ral no rm
mi ght make a diffe rence in whethe r the p rosecuto r will gain o r lose the as
sistance of a key witness. A misstep he re can make the diffe rence between a
ri ghteous conviction and a colossal waste of fede ral resou rces.
But even fo r fede ral prosecuto rs who a re sensitive to cultu ral diffe rences
0
and conce rned enou gh to make ex trao rdina ry effo rts,1 2 the shee r distance be
tween United States Atto rney's O ffices and many of the fede ral Indian
rese rvations they se rve p resent t remendous obstacles that the ave ra ge violent
c rime p rosecutor in the state system does not face. Perhaps as a result, United
States Atto rneys have been widely c riticized fo r decades fo r failing to give
w
p rope r attention to Indian coun try cases. 3 The substance of such complaints
almost always involves the failure to p rosecute a ggressively enou gh and al
04
most neve r involves complaints of "ove r-prosecution."1
Because of the non -reviewability of decisions to decline p rosecution o r to
unde r-prosecute, the weak o r nonexistent political accountability of fede ral
p rosecuto rs to t ribal communities, and the lack of media inte rest in Indian
count ry prosecutions, fede ral p rosecuto rs feel little exte rnal pressu re to t reat
Indian count ry cases se riously. Unde r such a scheme, well-intentioned fede ral
p rosecuto rs will wo rk ha rd in Indian count ry, and many do. But even hi gh
levels of commitment and inte rest by fede ral p rosecuto rs a re no substitute fo r
actual accountability. Those p rosecutors who a re not committed to Indian
count ry cases will simply not pursue them. And in Indian coun try, it is o ften
IOI.

Chaney, supra note 54, a t 39.

I 02.
Some federal prosecutors are members of Indian tribes and at least one serves his own
reservation, but such circumstances are unusual.
1 03. See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE WITH TIMOTHY CARR SEWARD, PLANTING TAIL
FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 1 62 ( 1 997) ("In practical application, federal
law enforcement agents, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's
Office, have demonstrated a history of declining to investigate or prosecute violations of the Major
Crimes Act."); Larry Cunningham, Note, Deputization of Indian Prosecutors: Protecting Indian
Interests in Federal Court, 88 GEO. L.J. 2 1 87, 2 1 88 (2000) ("[M]any U.S. Attorneys have abdicated
their responsibility to prosecute crimes in Indian country committed by non-Indians."); EchoHawk,
supra note 12, at 99- 100 ("U.S. Attorneys often decline to prosecute Major Crimes Act cases on the
reservation because of a mixture of factual, legal, practical, or logistical problems."); B.J. Jones,

Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal
Federal Court Relations, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 457, 5 1 3 ( 1 998) ("Federal prosecutors, busy
with prosecuting a variety of more serious crimes, perhaps have been remiss in devoting the neces
sary attention to the problems that arise when non-Indians commit offenses in Indian country . . . .");
Peter Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man 's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895, 963 (2002) ("U.S.
Attorneys, unlike state prosecutors, typically decline to prosecute in a far greater percentage of
cases . . . . [resulting] in the underenforcement of criminal laws in Indian country."); Amy Radon,
Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian Accountability on the
Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 275, 1 278 (2004) ("Because federal prosecutors decline to
prosecute [domestic violence], the law provides no deterrent effect . . . ."); Tim Vollmann, Criminal
Jurisdiction in Indian Country: Tribal Sovereignty and Defendants ' Rights in Conflict, 22 U. KAN.
L. REV. 387, 403 ( 1 974) ("[O]verburdened U.S. Attorneys are not notorious for seeking further
responsibilities of prosecution in Indian Country . . . ."); cf. Laurence Davis, Criminal Jurisdiction
over Indian Country in Arizona, 1 ARIZ. L. REV. 62, 72-73 ( 1 959) (noting reluctance of federal
prosecutors and federal courts to handle petty offenses over which they also have jurisdiction in
Indian country, with the result that "petty frauds and simple assaults" by non-Indians against Indi
ans, "which are fairly numerous-usually escape prosecution entirely").
1 04.

Davis, supra note 103, at 72-73.
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the decisions not to prosecute, called "declinations," that cause the most grief
ws
As a result, it would appear that federal Indian country

and consternation.

prosecutors are failing in precisely the area in which their discretion is subject
106
The extensive critical commentary

to the least scrutiny and accountability.

in academic literature may be the most serious negative repercussion that
101
these federal officials face. The result is that criminal justice in Indian coun
try is occasionally pursued aggressively and is sometime ignored, making
108

criminal justice a haphazard event at best for Indian tribes.

Accountability and control of governing institutions has become a key in
109

dicator of tribal success in improving tribal economic and social conditions.

Indeed, lack of accountability by federal law enforcement has been identified
1w
as a chief problem for effective policing in Indian country.
Given the close
relationship between police and prosecutors, it follows that lack of account
ability by prosecutors may pose similar problems.
In summary, the fundamental criminal law justifications for broad prose
cutorial discretion simply do not apply when a federal prosecutor is working
in Indian country. Unlike a narcotics distribution offense, which is subject to
federal jurisdiction wherever it occurs within the exterior boundaries of the
United States, the federal prosecutor has jurisdiction over Indian country of
fenses only if the offense occurred in Indian country. Yet the federal
prosecutor is unaccountable to the relevant community and has no particular
motivation to address community concerns. The Indian country regime thus
imposes an important responsibility on federal prosecutors without imposing
any accountability. The ramifications of this structural problem are enormous
and undermine the legitimacy of the federal prosecutor's power in Indian
country cases. These problems, though serious, are exacerbated by an even
deeper problem in Indian country cases to which this Article now turns.

1 05.

See id.

1 06. To be fair, such complaints are not limited to Indian country. As Roscoe Pound once
wrote about the American system, "[c]omplaint of non-enforcement is as old as the law itself."
POUND, supra note 88, at 1 2.
1 07. See supra note 1 03 and accompanying text (criticizing federal prosecutors for high dec
lination rates).
1 08.
My colleague Michael Tonry offered the important insight that under-prosecution by
federal prosecutors may not necessarily be problematic because it presumably makes tribal justice
systems more relevant in cases in which the federal authorities decline to prosecute.
1 09. See generally Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where 's the Glue? Institutional and
Cultural Foundations of American Indian Economic Development, 29 J. Soc10-EcoN. 443 (2000);
Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development Challenge in
Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 1 87 ( 1 998); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P.
Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really Come from? Constitutional Rule Among the Con
temporary Sioux and Apache, 33 EcoN. INQUIRY 402 ( 1 995).
1 1 0. WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42 at 43-44, 49 (concluding that accountability for polic
ing on Indian reservations is diffused both by federal control that reduces tribal involvement and by
diffusing authority among numerous different bureaucratic actors) .
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3. Federal Prosecutors and the Cavalry Effect

For many Americans, the phrase, "the ca valry has arri ve d," has come to
be a humorous an d informal euphemism for the arri val of help or rescue ; in
popular usage, the phrase presumably creates a sense of relief in the listener.
For In dian tribes, in contrast, the arri val of the ca valry has rarely been cause
for relief or celebration an d it often has quite the opposite connotation in
In dian country. To members of many In dian tribes, the wor d "cavalry"
brings to min d oppression, rapaciousness,111 mur der, an d e ven genoci de.11 2
In In dian country, the fe deral government is hel d in the esteem it has
e arne d in more than two centuries of f ederal-tribal relations.113 Its reputation
in In dian country has been forge d, in part, by the nineteenth -century ca valry
officers who committe d atrocious actions, such as mur der,114 an d the In dian
agents who committe d atrocious omissions, such as the withhol ding of
treaty -guarantee d foo d an d supplies in winter.11 5 Its reputation was forme d
by the actions of go vernment officials who use d gifts of smallpox -infecte d
blankets to destroy tribal communities 11 6 an d by f ederal officials who unilat
7
erally violate d treaties an d encourage d pri vate actors to do the same,11 an d,
in more recent years, the fe deral trustee that lost track of the recor ds of mil
lions an d perhaps billions of dollars of In dian assets hel d by the Department
of the Interior in tribal accounts an d In di vi dual In dian Money accounts.118
Enter the well-intentione d fe deral prosecutor seeking to prosecute a vio
lent crime in In dian country. While fe deral prosecutors may be talente d an d
committe d public ser vants who are trying to " do goo d" by helping to pro
vi de public safety or bringing justice to In dian country, each carries
tremen dous moral, emotional, an d symbolic freight of which he may not

1 1 1 . See EDWARD LAZARUS, BLACK HILLS WHITE JUSTICE ( 1 999) (discussing General
George Custer's extraordinary efforts to appeal to gold prospectors to violate federal treaty obliga
tions that protected the B lack Hills in the Great Sioux Nation).
1 1 2. While words like "genocide" should be used advisedly, it is surely appropriate in the
context of the Wounded Knee and Sand Creek massacres, both of which involved the indiscriminate
killing of women and children by American soldiers. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1 94-95 (Sand Creek), 292-93 (Wounded Knee) ( 1 989).
1 1 3 . Then-Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover issued an apology to tribes on behalf of the BIA
in September of 2000 . Brian Stockes, Gover Apologizes for Atrocities of the Past, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY, Sept. 20, 2000, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=63 I .
1 1 4.

DE BO, supra note 1 1 2, at 1 94-95, 292-93.

1 1 5.

See Minnesota v . Mille Lacs Band o f Chippewa Indians, 526 U . S . 1 72 ( 1 999).

1 1 6. For one account and citation to much of the historical literature on these events, see
Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional
Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 405--07
(2003).
1 1 7.

See LAZARUS, supra note 1 1 1 .

1 1 8. See Cobell v. Norton, No. 1 :96CVO l 285, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 4303 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
20, 2003).

736

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:709

even be aware. Indians and Indian tribes have long memories. Such is the
. .
power of oral trad 1t 10ns.119
Though experiences vary from tribe to tribe, the federal prosecutor in In
dian coun try is, in some respects, the direct lineal descendant of the blue
coated, sword-wielding cavalry officer ; the prosecutor represents the very
same federal gove rnment that committed cruel and violent acts against Indian
tribes for more than a century. He represents the gove rnment that has made
and then broken sacred promises. Yet he shows up on the tribal member 's
doorstep with the claim, "I am here to help you obtain justice." Given the his
tory of federal -tribal relations, tribes have every reason to be suspicious of
such an o fficial and such a claim. In a real sense, for many reservation Indi
ans, the federal gove rnment continues to represent the enemy.
In such a context, the federal prosecution creates a political dynamic in
the tribe that must be addressed in virtually every case. Consider a typical
case of sexual abuse of a child : after the child victim reluctantly reports an
incident of abuse by another family member, it is surprisingly co mmon for
the victim's family members to align themselves with the defendant and
0
against the victim. This is not unheard of outside Indian country, 21 but it
1
21
represents a particularly serious problem in Indian coun try cases.
The dy
namic, though extremely unfortunate, is explainable. When the federal
gove rnment accuses a community member of a heinous offense and brings a
criminal compl aint or an indictment, the community may naturally become
protective of the accused defendant in the face of this outside authority, even
if the charges are based on a report by another tribal member. The family
may not perceive its choice as one between the perpetrator and the victim,
but between a tribal member and the United States gove rnment. As a result,
when the family chooses sides, it may line up behind the perpetrator and
against the child who has been victimized.
Given the long history of federal -tribal relations, the federal prosecutor
simply may not be anyone whom the community has any reason to trust. 21 2

1 1 9.
See, e.g. , John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Some Philosophical, Political and Legal Implications of
A merican A rcheological and Anthropological Theory, 70 UMKC L. REV. I , 45-46 (200 1 ) (describ
ing the power and legitimacy of tribal oral histories).
1 20.
Christine Adams, Note, Mothers Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Sexual Abuse:
Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 5 1 9, 523-24 { 1 994) (describing the
phenomenon and some of its harms).
121.
EchoHawk, supra note 1 2, at 99 (noting that an Indian parent's fear of losing custody
can cause the parent to support "herself, her family, and even the perpetrator" against white institu
tions (quoting Irl Carter & Lawrence J. Parker, lntrafamilial Sexual Abuse in American Indian
Familes, in FAMILY SEXUAL ABUSE: FRONTLINE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 1 06, 1 1 4 (Michael
Quinn Patton ed., 1 99 1 ))).
1 22.
Id. ("Many Indians distrust the legal and social authorities that could be most helpful to
them because of past experiences of unjust treatment."); cf Ronald S. Fischler, Child Abuse and
Neglect in American Indian Communities, 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 95, 98 ( 1 985) (noting that
even Indian Health Service physicians are "mistrusted as outsiders and federal government employ
ees"). This phenomenon is familiar to many criminal law professors who teach State v. Williams,
484 P.2d 1 1 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 97 1 ), a tragic case in which uneducated American Indian parents
were charged with manslaughter after failing to obtain medical treatment for their seventeen-month
old son for fear that the baby would be taken from them.
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The result is that the child victim is victimized anew by a political dynamic
that aligns the victim with the United States and against the community and
the defendant.123 This dynamic may well cause further psychological injuries
to the child victim of sexual assault and lead to the victim's alienation and
estrangement from family members. In that respect, a new harm is done to
the child that might not have occurred in the absence of the federal prosecu
tor. According to experts in the field, this alienation of a child from the
family often has psychological ramifications that are even more serious than
the harm done by the perpetrator of the sex offense.12 4 In addition to harming
victims, the dynamic may cause numerous lesser evils, such as practical
problems in prosecutions. It sometimes, no doubt, causes victims to recant
and frustrates effective prosecutions of sexual predators.125 As a result, sex
ual predators are not effectively removed from the community.
Use of a federal prosecutor likely creates a host of other less -serious
problems as well. Even leaving out the emotional and historical baggage
that creates the political dynamic that I will characterize as the "cavalry ef 
fect," child sex abuse cases are among the most difficult cases to prosecute
success fully, even in the best of circumstances. As an alien to the commu
nity, the federal prosecutor is likely to find it difficult to communicate with
the Indian child and even more difficult to convince the child victim to par
ticipate in a trial. As evidence that these problems are very real, federal
prosecutors have taken to employing "victim-witness coordinators"126 who
often work to bridge the cultural gap between the Indian victims and the
federal prosecutors.12 7 Without the assistance of the victim-witness advo 
cates, Indian country prosecutions would be far less success ful.
While the child sexual assault case presents perhaps the most tragic in
stance of this phenomenon, the "cavalry effect" likely occurs, to some
degree , in any case in which the United States sides with an Indian victim
against an Indian perpetrator in an intratribal dispute. Indeed, the dynamic
has existed in tribes since the early nineteenth century in many different
circumstances as tribal members turned against others who assisted federal
officials.128
The cavalry metaphor offers one other key insight : the cavalry chooses
its battles care fully and then leaves when the battle is over. One telltale sign
of the lack of trust of federal law enforcement and prosecutors is the fact

1 23. This phenomenon is present in many intrafamily child sex abuse cases, see Adams, supra
note 1 20, but it is likely exacerbated in cases involving a federal prosecutor and an Indian community.
1 24.

Id. (citing numerous authorities).

1 25 . See generally Fischler, supra note 1 22, a t 1 02 (noting that families often suppress evi
dence and bring pressure on victims to change their testimony).
1 26 . See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Wisconsin, Victim and Witness
Assistance Unit, http://www.justice.gov/usao/wie/vicwit/ (last visited Dec. 1 7, 2005).
1 27 .

The USAOs frequently hire tribal members t o serve in these positions.

1 28. Cf Ex parte Crow Dog, 1 09 U.S. 556 (1 883); MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HIS
TORY OF THE CHEROKEE NATION 1 83 8- 1 907, at 1 6- 1 9 ( 1 938) (discussing the murder of Cherokee
leader John Ross apparently for his role in agreeing to federal efforts at Cherokee removal).
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t hat many cr imes are never even reported. 1 29 One key reason for t he fa ilure
to report is that v ict ims do not trust the federal aut hor it ies to protect them
0
from retal iat ion. 31 Like t he cavalry, federal prosecutors and FB I ' agents
swoop in occas ionally to prosecute a perpetrator, but t hey do not ma inta in a
constant presence and do not necessar ily cons ider t he broader impact of
t he ir work. They address only t he ser ious offenses and t hey leave w hen eac h
case is concluded. It is up to t he tr ibal commun ity to address ot her offenses
and t he aftermath of t he felony and to attempt to restore t he fabr ic of t he
commun ity. Even assuming that t he federal prosecutors w ho agree to handle
suc h cases are generous, selfless, and comm itted to better ing the l ives of the
reservat ion commun ity (as most of them no doubt are), even the best of in
tent ions may not always be able to overcome the hand icaps noted here in.
Cons ider one obv ious alternat ive approach: a tr ibal prosecutor. As a
member of the Ind ian country commun ity, a tr ibal prosecutor m ig ht face
f ew of t he hand icaps that t he federal prosecutor faces. A tr ibal prosecutor
would not be forced into t he same dynam ic-s he could represent t he
commun ity and t he commun ity would feel less of a need to attempt to pro
tect t he defendant aga inst an e xternal aut hor ity. In add it ion, unl ike t he
federal prosecutor, a tr ibal prosecutor would presumably l ive w it hin t he
commun ity. T his would convey a much stronger sense of interest and in
vestment in t he commun ity and would allow t he prosecutor to help t he
commun ity address t he collateral issues that ar ise from t he prosecut ion.
T he presence of t he prosecutor w it hin t he commun ity m ight also g ive
greater comfort to t hose v ict ims of cr ime w ho are unw ill ing to come for
ward. Moreover, a tr ibal prosecutor m ight act- in a var iety of ways- in a
fas hion more compat ible w ith commun ity norms.
4. Obstacles to Tribal Governance and Self-Determination

In add it ion to t he problems noted above, t he role of federal prosecutors
creates a ser ious obstacle to tr ibal self -determ inat ion. Use of a federal
prosecutor to address major cr imes between Indians sends a clear message
of inf er ior ity about tr ibal law enforcement and tr ibal courts, t hat is, t hat
tr ibes cannot handle felon ies. And it robs the tr ibal commun ity of leaders hip
in one of the most important areas of governance: ma intenance of publ ic
safety and crim inal just ice. In some respects, t he system can create a vac
uum of tr ibal leaders hip on publ ic safety issues that can e xacerbate cr ime
problems by s idel in ing t he people who m ig ht be best able to address these
ser ious issues.
Cons ider the pol it ical ram ificat ions at t he tr ibal level. In myr iad ways,
federal prosecutors need the ass istance of tr ibal governments in prosecut ing
Ind ian country cases. T hey may need ev idence from a tr ibal reg istrar t hat a

1 29.

WAKELING ET AL.,

1 30.

Id.

supra note 42, at 1 3-14.
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Or they may need offi

cial tribal real property records documenting the status of the land on which
the offense occurred. Or they may simply need help locating witnesses. But
even in circumstances in which the assistance of tribal officials is crucial to
the prosecution of the case, it may be politically problematic for a tribal of
ficial to appear to be assisting federal prosecutors in the prosecution of a
1 32
In such a case, the system essentially asks a tribal official
tribal member.
to take sides not only against one of his own constituents but with a long
time enemy. In that respect, the "cavalry effect" may animate tribal officials
in the same way that it takes hold in Indian families; it may make tribal offi
cials reluctant to assist federal prosecutors.
The existence of the federal prosecutor thus creates structural barriers to
tribal participation in the prosecution. While tribal leaders may be criticized
when they fail to provide assistance in such circumstances (and perhaps they
should be), these structural problems simply do not exist in other federal
prosecutorial contexts or in state prosecutions of crimes equivalent to those
enumerated in the Major Crimes Act. This handicap is created solely by the
dynamics of the federal scheme.
Other serious political ramifications exist as well. Tribal officials are
likely more knowledgeable than federal officials about remote Indian reserva
tions and are also likely to be much more responsive to the tribal community.
Yet a tribal leader running for election would be ill-advised to promise his
constituents that he could address serious public safety and criminal justice
1 33
problems on the reservation; he simply lacks control of the key resources.
To make such a promise, he would need to have assurances from federal offi
cials. Given the history of promises by federal officials, even in sacred
treaties, a tribal official would be foolish to count on any such assurance. As a
result, even in circumstances in which tribal governments do not actively seek
to frustrate federal prosecutions, tribal leaders are much less likely to be in
vested in felony criminal justice. One of the telltale signs of the lack of official
interest in these issues is the fact that crime statistics are so difficult to obtain
34
for Indian reservations. 1 One would be hard-pressed to find a mayor of a
major American city who was unaware of the crime rate for that city. Yet tribal
leaders do not routinely collect such data and would be hard-pressed to an
swer such a question, partially no doubt because they often do not have line
1 35
authority over the law enforcement officers involved.
If tribal political

United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1 277 ( 1 0th Cir. 200 1 ) (suggesting that proof of tribal
131.
status of victim and or defendant may be an element of the offense).
1 32. See, e.g., United States v. Velarde, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1 3 1 4 (D.N.M. 1 999). In Velarde, the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe sought to quash federal subpoenas that the United States Attorney served on
various tribal officials in order to establish j urisdiction over a defendant accused of raping an eight
year-old child. Id. The court rejected the tribe's efforts to prevent federal prosecutors from gaining
access to tribal records. Id. at 1 3 1 5 .
133.

See supra text accompanying notes 20-57.

1 34. See WAKELING ET AL., supra note 42, at vii (explaining that, for a variety of reasons,
tribal-level data about crime in Indian country is unavailable).
1 35 .

Id.
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leaders are unwilling to use their limited resources or stake their reputations
on improvement in this key area of tribal public policy, then improvements
may never occur.
Viewed from the standpoint of federal officials, the situation is equally
untenable. The existence of exclusively federal jurisdiction for felonies in
Indian country shifts the apparent responsibility to maintain institutions that
help to provide safe reservation environments away from local tribal offi
3
cials and toward federal o fficials. 1 6 The tribal leaders who have been
rendered impotent by the scheme theoretically can criticize and blame the
federal prosecutors but must shoulder little of the blame or accountability
for the problem. Thus, while federal prosecutors lack any sense of account
ability, they also likely do not even feel much appreciation for their work in
many cases.
In short, the federal Indian country regime creates an unfortunate and
indefensible paradox. It wrests control of the key and inherently local issue
of felony criminal justice away from tribal leadership and places control
over these issues in the hands of federal o fficials who have little account
ability to the tribal community and little incentive to be responsive. The
result is not only irrational from a criminal justice standpoint ; it is contrary
to the stated federal policies of tribal self -determination and self
gove mance.
1 7

C. Concluding Thoughts about Federal Prosecutors 3

Locating the power to prosecute in a federal official from outside the
reservation poses numerous practical problems, such as difficulty in obtain
ing the cooperation of witnesses at trial, and creates structural problems by
often converting the tribal government into an opponent of the prosecution ,
even when the prosecution would otherwise have worked to produce a safer
reservation environment. The cavalry e ffect and other problems related to
the Indian country criminal justice system in flict serious costs on the com
munity and serious damage to individual Indian defendants and victims.
This model of criminal justice, in which prosecutions are handled by an out
side authority and not the tribal government, creates a system that smacks
more of colonialism than of rational criminal justice policy. It simply is not
consistent with mode m principles of federal Indian policy and it is dys func
tional from the standpoint of federal criminal justice policy. It is for this
reason that federal Indian country prosecutions should be "de-colonize d."

1 36.
Cf Simons, supra note 67, at 93 1 ("When Congress expands the Department [of Jus
tice's] authority to fight local crime, it also expands the Department's responsibility to fight local
crime." (emphasis added)).
1 37. Because of the practical problems noted above and others, critical questions can also be
raised about the ability of federal defenders to provide competent representation in Indian country
cases. In the interest of space, the author leaves that subject for another day.
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While the prosecutor is ideally supposed to "represent" the community,
the greatest opportunity for the community to participate affirmatively in the
administration of criminal justice is, of course, through juries. In the Ameri
can criminal justice system, the jury trial is constituted not only as a key
procedural safeguard to the defendant, but to give the community a central
138
role in the administration of criminal justice.
The importance of the jury has been dramatically underscored-and
strongly reaffirmed-in a series of recent Supreme Cou rt cases. In Jones v.
139
141
140
United States,
Apprendi v. New Jersey,
R ing v. A rizona,
Blakely v.
142
143
Washington,
and United States v. Booker the Supreme Court used the

Si xth Amendment to strike down state and federal laws that sought to limit
the role of the jury in American criminal justice . Juries were given a hal
lowed role in the American judicial system when the founders created the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. And, as these cases illustrate, that role is
just as important to the criminal trial today as it was then. For reasons set
forth more fully below, the Indian country community tends to be absent
from the juries that hear Indian country cases. Because of the central impor
tance of community participation, through juries, in insuring the legitimacy
of federal convictions, I argue that the absence of the Indian community is a
serious problem. This Part will e xplain why juries are important, how the
Supreme Court and Congress have sought to ensure their representativeness,
why Indian country juries fall short, and why challenges to this system have
been unsuccess ful.
A. The Centrality of the Jury in A merican Criminal Justice
The Constitution guarantees that "trial of all crimes . . . shall be by Jury ;
and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have
been committed."144 The Si xth Amendment creates additional rules, guaran
teeing, inter alia, "the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State" and that the trial occur in the "district wherein the crime shall
1 38.
Some scholars, such as Akhil Amar, argue that community involvement is not merely a
safeguard for the defendant, but also represents the community's independent right to be involved in
criminal justice. AK HIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
( 1 998).
1 39.
526 U.S. 227 (1999) (holding that facts rendering defendant subject to greater statutory
penalties must be treated as elements of the offense and found by the j ury).
140.
530 U.S. 466 (2000) (finding that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum
must be found by the jury).
141.
536 U.S. 584 (2002) (noting that the presence or absence of aggravating factors that
would lead to imposition of the death penalty must be found by jury).
142.
542 U.S. 296 (2004) (determining that facts relevant to mandatory guidelines must be
found by the j ury).
143.
1 25 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (recognizing that the Federal Sentencing Reform Act did not meet
the Sixth Amendment requirements for j ury involvement in sentencing).
144.

U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2. This is often referred to as the "venue requirement."
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have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
,,
by 1aw . . . . 145
While the language of the Sixth Amendment is phrased as a guarantee
of the rights of the criminal defenda nt, both the Sixth Amendment and
Article I ll's trial provision are thought to serve a valuable community in
terest as well : insuring the community's participation in the criminal
JUSt ice system.146
The motivation for enacting these provisions can be found in key events
that occurred shortly before this nation's founding.147 Following the Boston
Massacre in which British soldiers were accused of killing American colo
nists, the British soldiers were tried in Boston before local juries.148 Because
the British Parliament wished to prevent future trials of British soldiers,
which might occur before biased juries, the British Parliament enacted the
Administration of Justice Act that provided that British officials would
thereafter be taken to England and tried there for crimes in the colonies.149
This Act was one of the " Intolerable Acts" complained of in the Declaration
0
of Independence.15 Thus, at the time of the founding of the Republic, the
Founders had clear reason to be aware of the need to preserve local partici 
1
pation in criminal justice, through the jury system. 51
The Founders' concerns for preserving local control over criminal jus 
tice continue to inform interpretation of the constitutional provisions that
52
they drafted. Writing for the Court in Smith v. Texas1 in 1 940, Justice Black
described juries as "instruments of public justice" and held that a jury must
be constituted in large measure in a manner that ensures that it is "a body
•

•

1 45 .

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

See Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine,
Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 50 1 , 546 ( 1 986) ("One function of the jury, although not
1 46.

the only function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system
by injecting representative community voices and values into the decision process."); see also
Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57
VAND. L. REV. 885, 888 (2004) ("Theoretically, jury sentences would take into account the full
range of penalties authorized by the legislature and mirror community norms concerning retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation."). King and Noble also refer to juries as a "commu
nity-based barometer" of punishment. Id.
1 47. See generally AMAR, supra note 1 38, at 106; see also BERNHARD KNOLLENBERG,
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1 766-1775, at 66-69 ( 1 975) (discussing colonial up
heaval over British attempts to remove treason trials to Great Britain in 1 769).
1 48. See generally HILLER B. ZOBEL, THE BOSTON MASSACRE 225-303 ( 1 970) (providing a
detailed account of the Boston Massacre trials, j ury selections, and effects of the verdicts on the
Boston population).
1 49. KNOLLENBERG, supra note 1 47 , at 1 1 9 (discussing outrage over the Administration of
Justice Act labeled "The Murdering Act" by many colonials); Steven A. Engel, The Public's \!ici
nage Right: A Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 658, 1 683 (2000).
1 50.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 7 (U.S. 1 776).

1 5 1 . See generally Engel, supra note 1 49, a t 1 684-85 (discussing how the Continental Con
gress responded to British attempts to remove trials from the hands of local juries: "The Continental
Congress understood the vicinage presumption to be a structural property of the 'great right,' one
that served not only the interests of the defendant, but those of the community as well").
1 52.

3 1 1 U.S. 1 28, 1 30 ( 1 940).
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truly representative of the community."1 53 Shortly thereafter , in Glasser v.
1
United States, 54 the Court indicated that a representative jury is fundamental
to the "basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative govern,,
ment. 1 55

The notion that the jury 's primary purpose is to represent the community
comes through in many modern cases as well. In Taylor v. Louisiana,1 56 for
example, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional notion of trial by
jury implicitly "presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative
of the community."1 5 Highlighting the "political function" of the jury , the
Supreme Court explained , "the jury is designed not only to understand the
case , but also to reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it."1 58
According to the Court, " [c ]ommunity participation in the administration of
the criminal law . . . is . . . critical to public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system."1 59
It would ta ke many pages to provide a full catalogue of the Supreme
Court's statements as to the role that juries serve in the American criminal
justice system. The most consistent theme underlying all of these functions ,
however, is that the jury provides a role for the community in criminal jus
0
tice.16 A recent case reflects the essence of much of the Supreme Court's
rhetoric :
The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of
justice has long been recognized as one of the principle j ustifications for
retaining the j ury system . . . .

Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the
right of parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all the
people. It affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in
a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for
law. Indeed, with the exception of voti ng, for most citizens, the honor and

1 53. Smith, 3 1 1 U.S. at 1 30. Professor Massaro argues that this represents the first time the
Court recognized the interest of community values in this context. See Massaro, supra note 1 46, at
532. Professor Randall Kennedy finds such an interest recognized as early as Strauder v. West °Vir
ginia, 100 U.S. 303 ( 1 880). RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 1 70 ( 1 997).
1 54.

3 1 5 U.S. 60 ( 1 942).

1 55.

Glasser, 3 1 5 U.S. at 85.

1 56.

4 1 9 U.S. 522 (1975).

1 57 .
Taylor, 4 1 9 U.S. a t 530-3 1 (quoting Thiel
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

v.

S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 2 1 7, 227 ( 1 946)

1 58. Id. at 529 & n.7 (quoting with approval a House Report on the Jury Selection and Ser
vice Act of 1968, H.R. REP. No. 90- 1076, at 8 ( 1968), reprinted in 1 968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1 797).
1 59.

Id. at 530.

1 60. See Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 2 ("Popular participation in criminal trials also serves
community interests . . . . Juries . . . satisfy the community's desire to participate in, and conse
quently to effect some control over, the criminal justice system. The jury interjects community
conscience into the process, if only symbolically.").
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privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in
the democratic process.

161

The Supreme Court has also suggested myriad ways in which juries improve
the quality of criminal justice, many of which hinge directly on community
involvement. One broad way that juries improve the criminal justice system
is simply by providing twelve different human perspectives on the evidence
2
and thus improving the quality of the ultimate verdict.16
Perhaps one of the most compelling functions of the jury is to serve as
one of the "checks and balances" in American governance.163 The jury
guards against official corruption by pulling together a group of citizens and
64
empowering them to watch over the work of the prosecutor and the judge.1
The jury interposes the "common sense judgment" of the community be
tween the defendant and powerful government officials.165 For many of these
166
reasons, the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana that juries are
fundamental to our system of ordered liberty and that the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process provision incorporates the right to a trial by jury
and thus requires state courts to provide juries.
Another major function that juries serve is overtly political and it goes in
two directions. Just as communities, through juries, affect the administration
of criminal justice, the criminal justice system uses the jury to educate the
public and to ensure the legitimacy of the system. Jury duty "educates citi
zens in the mechanics of their justice system."167 Juries ensure "public
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system"168 and ensure pub-

161.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406-07 ( 1 99 1 ) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Given the rhetoric of Supreme Court cases, one can easily see why some of the members of Con
gress who favored passage of the Major Crimes Act thought that participation in federal criminal
justice might have the effect of "civilizing" and assimilating the Indians. The problem is that adop
tion of the Major Crimes Act did not come hand-in-hand with Indian participation on federal j uries
or in any role in the j udicial process, other than as defendants.
1 62.
Taylor, 4 19 U.S. at 535 (discussing the "quality of community judgment represented by
the jury in criminal trials").
1 63 .

Duncan v . Louisiana, 39 1 U.S. 145, 1 55-56 ( 1 968).

1 64. Id. at 1 55 . By placing the ultimate decisionmaking powers in the jury, the existing struc
ture guards against corruption of judicial officers. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 2 1 (1997) (citing T HE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
1 65.

See Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 0.

1 66.

391 U.S. 145 ( 1 968).

Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 5; see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 400 ( 1 990);
1 67.
Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race
on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63, 1 1 5 ( 1 993) ("In addition, because jury trials educate jurors
in self-governance, deterring discriminatory j ury selection practices helps to ensure that all citizens
have an equal opportunity for the civic education jury service provides." (citation omitted)); Mas
saro, supra note 146, at 5 1 5 (..A powerful reminder of the educational aspect of j ury trials is the
positive reaction many citizens have to their service as jurors. Moreover, to the extent their encoun
ter with the justice system increases jurors' respect for judgments, it preserves government power."
(citation omitted)).
1 68.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9 U.S. 522, 530 ( 1 975).
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li e acce ptance of judicial outcomes.169 T hey "satisfy t he community's desire
to partici pate in , and consequently to effect some control over, t he criminal
70
justice system. "1 It is for t his reason t hat some Justices would even hold
t hat t he Eig ht h Amendment proscri ption on cruel and unusual punis hment
contains an im plicit principle t hat capital punis hment may be imposed only
by a jury and not by a judge ; t he jury has a "com parative advantage " over
t he judge in ex pressing "t he community 's moral sensibility " and is more
1
li kely to "ex press t he conscience of t he community."1 1
B. Representative Juries and A n ti-Discrimination in Jury Composition
Because of t he key role t hat t he jury plays in representing t he commu
nity , t he Supreme Court began addressing racially discriminatory jury
172
com position soon after t he Civil War. In Strauder v. West Virginia in 1 879,
t he Su preme Court overturned a blac k man 's murder conviction because t he
state had ex plicitly excluded blac ks from serving on t he jury , holding t hat
t he Fourteent h Amendment's Equal Protection Clause pro hibits exclusion of
blac k jurors from juries in state courts. T he Court discussed two different
ty pes of rig hts in its decision. First , it recognized t hat t he blac k community
has a "rig ht to participate in t he administration of t he law " t hat may not be
73
denied t hroug h racially discriminatory state laws.1 Second , t he Court rec 
ognized t he rig ht of t he blac k defendant to a trial by a jury selected wit hout
1
discrimination against ot hers of his race. 74
T he very next year , in Neal v. Delaware, t he Supreme Court held t hat
eve n de facto discrimination was actionable.175 In t hat case , even t houg h
Delaware's law was not explicit in excluding blac ks , t he Su preme Court
overturned a blac k defendant's rape conviction on t he basis of de facto dis
crimination in lig ht of evidence establis hing t hat a blac k person had never
16
served on a jury in t he entire state of Delaware.1 In ot her words , t he jury 's
representative role was so im portant t hat t he Court was willing to protect it
against even possibly accidental and unintentional actions t hat diminis hed
t he jury 's re presentativeness.
1 69. See id. ; see also Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contempo
rary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 75 1 ( 1 993) (suggesting
that a goal of race-conscious jury selection is that "it enhances public respect for criminal proceed
ings and acceptance of their results"); Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 7 ("[J]ury selection procedures
must produce juries that correspond to people's images of a fair jury. Otherwise, people will distrust
jury verdicts regardless of the 'correctness' of those results on the merits, and the jury will lose the
respect essential to effective decision making.").
1 70.

Massaro, supra note 146, at 5 1 2.

1 7 1 . Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 6 1 3-14 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Justice
Stevens's dissent in Harris v. Alabama, 5 1 3 U.S. 504, 5 1 5-26 (1 995)).
1 72.

1 00 U.S. 303 ( 1 880).

1 73.

Strauder, 1 00 U.S. at 308; see also KENNEDY, supra note 153, at 1 69-7 1 .

1 74.

Strauder, 1 00 U.S. at 309.

1 75.

1 03 U.S. 370 ( 1 8 8 1 ).

1 76.

Neal, 1 03 U.S. at 370.
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During the next century, the Court 's jurispru dence on juries expan de d
tremen dously. I n the 1930s, the Court use d the prece dent in Neal v. Dela
ware to overturn convictions of black def en dants in an Alabama county in
which no living person coul d remember a black person ever serving on a
1 7 an d in a Kentucky county in which no black person ha d serve d in the
jury 7
18
previous thirty years. 7
In 1968, during the civil rights movement, Congress enacte d a law gov
erning the selection of f ederal juries that co difie d much of the ant i
discrim ination jurispru dence enunciate d by the Supreme Court in these
cases an d others. The Jury Selection an d Service A d79 ( " JS S A") now pro
vi des the basic legal rules that apply to jury selection in fe deral cases,
inclu ding those arising in In dian country. The J S S A generally provi des that
all litigants in fe deral courts who are entitle d to trial by jury "shall have the
right to gran d an d petit juries selecte d at ran dom from a fair cross section of
. ,, 80
th e commu mty. 1
While the statutory rules for jury selection apply in both civil an d
criminal cases, the Supreme Court has elevate d the J S S A's rules to consti
tutional status in criminal cases, hol ding that the Sixth Amen dment
guarantee of an "impartial" jury means a jury that is selecte d from a venire
1 1 Despite the
that constitutes a " fair cross section of the community." 8
statutory gui dance in the J S S A, Supreme Court case law continues to in
form the analysis substantially.
182
In Duren v. Missouri, the Supreme Court set forth an analytical ap
proach to determine whether the fair cross section requirement was violate d.
To prove such a claim, the defen dant must establish:
( I ) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the com
munity; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which
j uries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of
such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due
183

to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.

While the requirement of a fair cross-section does not exten d to the final
1 racial discrimination in the selection of the jury is
composition of the jury, 84
1 77.

Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 ( 1 935).

1 78 .

Hale v . Kentucky, 303 U . S . 6 1 3 ( 1 938).

1 79.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1 86 1 - 1 869 (2000) .

1 80.

28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000) .

1 8 1 . See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 477 ( 1 990); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
( 1 979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9 U.S. 522, 528 ( 1 975). Because federal law does not distinguish
between the methods of selection of the pools from which grand or petit juries are chosen and the
similar community representative purposes of each type of jury, the courts have treated issues as to
the selection of either type of jury similarly. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 86 1 -1 869 (2000)).
1 82.

Duren, 439 U.S. 357 ( 1 979).

1 83 .

Id. a t 364 (internal quotations omitted).

Taylor, 4 1 9 U.S. at 538; see also Holland, 493 U.S. 474 ( 1 990). In Holland, the Court
1 84.
indicated that the Sixth Amendment requires a venire that is representative of the community so that
a j ury will be "drawn from a representative cross section of the community," id. at 480 (quoting
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c onsidered an unconstituti onal "ha rm" to the "entire c ommunity" that "un
dermine [s ] public c onfidence in the fa irness of our system of justice."185
F ocusing primarily on A frican Americans, Pr ofess or Randall Kennedy
has addressed many of the pr oblems related t o underrepresentati on of mem
bers of min ority gr oups on juries. As Kennedy has explained, the failure t o
include A frican Americans on juries regarding crimes that affect their c om
8
munities can have serious practical ramificati ons. 1 6 A c ommunity denied its
pr oper r ole in the cri minal justice system may feel aggrie ved and may seek
justice by other means. C onsider, for example, the trial against white p olice
officers accused of beating A frican American R odney King, which was
m oved out of Los Angeles t o Simi Valley, a pred ominantly white suburb.
When the Simi Valley jury returned n ot guilty verdicts on the m ost seri ous
charges, members of the black c ommunity in Los Angeles percei ved a mis
carriage of justice. The ensuing ri ot was the m ost destructi ve in the United
States in the twentieth century, culminating in fi fty -tw o deaths, th ousands of
87
injuries, and nearly a billi on d ollars of pr operty damage. 1 In any e vent,
p ositi ve law in the United States has created general rules that ensure the
R odney King case is excepti onal. American law is generally pr otecti ve of
the jury's c ommunity-representati ve r ole in cri minal justice.
C. Underrepresentation of Native Americans on Indian Country Juries
Despite the n ormati ve principle of representati veness, Indians tend n ot
t o be well represented in federal juries in Indian c ountry cases. E ven in
states with large Indian p opulati ons, Indians remain a very small fracti on of
the p opulati on. 8
1 8 As a result, Indians w ould be expected t o have minimal
representati on in the jury venire. H owever, the statistics indicate l ower
numbers than one w ould expect. Underrepresentati on e ven of the existing
small fracti on of the p opulati on may occur for a variety of reas ons. First,
1 9 Because juries in m ost federal
Indians are am ong the p oorest Americans. 8

Taylor, 4 1 9 U.S. at 527), but that "[t]he 'representativeness' constitutionally required at the venire
stage can be disrupted" for good reason while empanelling the jury through the exercise of peremp
tory and cause strikes against particular members, id. at 483.
1 85.

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 ( 1 986).

1 86.

KENNEDY, supra note 1 53, at 1 17-1 8.

1 87. Id. ; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 8 1 ( 1 996). Such civil unrest may be effec
tive in gaining the attention of policymakers in ways that mere case law cannot.
1 88. Even in the states with the largest percentages of American Indians, Indians account for
less than twenty percent of the total population and usually less than ten percent. See STELLA U.
0GUNWOLE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: THE AMERI
CAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION: 2000, at 5 (2002).
1 89. Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriers to Native American Home Ownership on Tribal
lands: The Case of the Navajo Pannershipfor Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 434-35 (200 1 ) ("Indi
ans are among the poorest Americans. In 1990, almost one third (3 1 .2 percent) lived in poverty
much higher than the 1 990 national 1 3.5 percent poverty rate." (citation omitted)); see also Russel
Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277,
287 ( 1 993) (declaring Indians to be "among the poorest Americans").
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0
dist ricts are ch osen fr om state v oter r olls,19 "fe de ral jury veni res un derrep
resent the p oor" who are less li kely t o registe r t o v ote an d, even if they have
registe re d, a re m ore li kely t o have m ove d since they last registe re d.191
Even asi de fr om p overty, In dians may well have l owe r rep resentati on in
the p otential p ool than their small abs olute numbe rs might fo recast. In dians
are, for e xample, li kely t o be far m ore investe d in their tribal g overnments
than state g overnments.192 Since juries a re routinely selecte d fr om v ote r reg
istrati on lists of state p olitical sub divisi ons, even relatively p olitically active
an d aware tribal members may nevertheless n ot be rep resente d if they focus
thei r activism s olely within the tribal g overnment. While the JS S A seems t o
3
all ow use of tribal v oting registrati on lists, it does n ot require such use. 1 9
Perhaps m ost imp ortant, h owever, is the ge ographic aspect of the p rob
lem. The fe deral districts that inclu de In dian reservati ons are physically
am ong the largest in the Unite d States.194 Because of the t remen dous sizes of
the districts, each ju dicial dist rict is divi de d int o multiple divisi ons. M ost
fe de ral c ourts are l ocate d in la rger cities, an d they ten d to assemble jury ve
ni res fr om the divisi on in which they sit. An d even if the c ou rt attempts t o
assemble juries fr om a divisi on that inclu des In dian reservati ons, the t rial
may well be hel d in an even m ore distant l ocati on in an othe r divisi on.195
1 90.
See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1 863(b)(2) (2000) (indicating
that each federal district must create its own plan for jury selection and indicating that such plan
shall use voter registration records or lists of actual voters from political subdivisions within the
state); see also King, supra note 169, at 7 1 2-1 7 (discussing some of the factors-for example, un
representative voter registration lists, mobility of population, educational history-that make
minorities less likely to be represented fairly in j ury pools).
191.
Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL.
L. REV. I O I , 1 03--04 ( 1996) (collecting studies across the country concluding that the poor are
underrepresented) .
1 9 2 . Some Indians fe e l that the unilateral extension o f American citizenship to them without
their consent was an act of "cultural genocide." See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ong

wehoweh and the Rise of the Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American
Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 1 5 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107 ( 1 999). It would be fair to
assume that many Native Americans holding these views might not register to vote in federal or
state elections.
1 93. The JSSA allows the names of prospective jurors to be selected from the "voter registra
tion lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions within the district or division." 28
U.S.C. § 1 863(b)(2); see also United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 909-10 (9th Cir. 200 1 )
(describing the Nevada federal jury selection plan as using the voter registration information only of
state and county offices and not of tribal governments).
1 94. There are ninety-four federal judicial districts in the United States and one United States
Attorney for each judicial district. From a geographical standpoint, the largest federal judicial dis
tricts are, in descending order, the Districts of Alaska, Montana, New Mexico, Arizona, and Nevada.
The states of Arizona, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, and South Dakota are each comprised of a
single statewide federal judicial district and each includes substantial Indian country jurisdiction.
The United States Attorney's Office in Alaska, which has very little Indian country jurisdiction, has
approximately twenty Assistant United .States Attorneys in total and a small number of support staff.
U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Alaska. http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ak/info/administrative.htm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2005). In Arizona, in contrast, Indian country makes up nearly twenty percent
of the land mass within the state. And in contrast to the small office in Alaska, the United States
Attorney's Office in Arizona has approximately 275 employees. U.S. Attorney's Office, District of
Arizona, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/index.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
1 95.

See United States v. Nakai, 4 1 3 F.3d 1 0 1 9 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Reservations are often located at great distances from the principle cities
where federal courts sit.
Consider, for example, the federal District of Arizona. In Arizona, the
Navajo reser vation sends more cases to the United States Attorney's Office
1
than all other tribes in the state combined. 96 Federal trials of these cases
routinely occur in Prescott or Phoenix. As the figure below indicates, Pres
cott is around one hundred miles, as the crow flies, from the closest point on
the Navajo Reservation and more than two hundred miles from the heart of
that reservation. By highway, these distances are much greater.
FIGURE I
ARIZONA INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES

0

25 50

I I I I I I

1 00 Miles
I

I

1 96.
PAUL K. CHARLTON, U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZ., U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 2004 INDIAN COUNTRY REPORT 64-69 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/reports/
2004rpt/azusao.pdf.
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Now conside r the fede ral District of Min nesot a. Though Minnesot a is
somewh at sm alle r th an A rizon a, 1 97 the geog raphic re ality is simil ar. All of
the fede ral Indi an count ry offenses in Minnesot a o rigin ate on two rese rv a
tions, the Red Lake Rese rv ation and the Bois Fo rt Rese rv ation in the
no rthe rn p art of the st ate. The fede ral c rimin al t ri als fo r these rese rv ations
routinely occur in the so-c alled Twin Cities of Minne apolis and St. P aul,
which is whe re all of the fede ral dist rict court judges' ch ambe rs are lo
c ated.198 As the figu re below indic ates, both rese rv ations lie a t remendous
dist ance from the Twin Cites, and the Red Lake rese rv ation, which p roduces
the v ast m ajo rity of the fede ral M ajo r C rimes c ases in the dist rict, is p articu
l arly remote from m ajo r highw ays, m aking it di fficult to re ach.
As a result of the geog raphic facto rs and the othe r phenomen a men
tioned p reviously, N ative Ame ric ans are poo rly rep resented on all fede ral
ju ry p anels. Bec ause ju ries in Indi an count ry c ases are selected in the s ame
m anner as all othe r fede ral c rimin al ju ries, Indi ans are almost neve r well
rep resented as ju ro rs in Indi an country c ases. In th at sense, they sh are m any
of the t radition al compl aints of other mino rity communities rel ated to the
composition of ju ries.199

1 97.
Arizona at approximately 1 1 4,000 square miles is almost half again as large as Minnesota which encompasses less than 80,000 square miles. RAND MCNALLY & Co., THE ROAD ATLAS
'05, at 8, 54 (2005).
1 98. See U.S. District Court, District of Minn., http://www.mnd.uscourts.gov (last visited
Nov. 13, 2005).

Cf Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the
1 99.
Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 80-8 1 (2004) (arguing that federal juries do not
properly represent communities in urban drug offense cases because the federal jury is drawn differ
ently than a jury that would be drawn under state law for a state prosecution); see also Paul B utler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 1 05 YALE L.J. 677
( 1 995). Some cases have also addressed similar issues. E.g., United States v. Osorio, 801 F. Supp.
966, 979-80 (D. Conn. 1 992) (defendant's challenge to a jury venire that excluded jurors from two
of the most populous and most minority-dense cities from the venire).
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D. Legal Challenges
Dr awing upon the leg al principles set forth in Duren v. Missouri, defen
d ants in Indi an coun try c ases h ave ch allenged jury pool co mposition in a
00
v ariety of circu mst ances as being underrepresent ative of N ative A meric ans.2

200.
Cf United States v. Gault, 1 4 1 F.3d 1 399 ( 1 0th Cir. 1998); United States v. Erickson, 75
F.3d 470 (9th Cir. 1 996); United States v. Herbert, 698 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1 983); United States v.
Haworth, 948 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.M. 1 996); United States v. Pleier, 849 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Alaska
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201

In an early Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Clifford, the defen
dant presented evidence that Indians living within the division from which
the trial jury was selected constituted 15.6% of the total populace, but that
only 8.4% of the jurors who served during a two -year period were Indian.
This evidence demonstrated an "absolute disparity" (the difference be
0
tween the figures) of 7.2% and a "comparative disparity " of 46%. 2 2 In
other words, each jury had, on average, 46% fewer Indians than it would
have had if its composition matched the representation of Indians in the
general population.
Following an analysis that generally tracked the three-step Duren ap
03
proach, 2 the Eighth Circuit recogni zed that Indians are a "distinctive
group" that should be represented in a fair cross -section of the commu
0
nity. 2 4 However, the Eighth Circuit held that the underrepresentation failed
Duren 's second factor, which asks whether the group's representation is
" fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the com
0
munity."2 5 The court held that the disparity established by the evidence
was not substantial enough as a matter of law to constitute a violation of
0
the JS S A or the Sixth Amendment. 2 6 Accordingly, the defendant was un
able to establish a prima facie violation and was unable even to reach the
third step of showing that the underrepresentation was due to "systematic
exclusion." Since that time, other challenges in the Eighth Circuit have
0
been equally unsuccess ful. 2 7
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue at about the same time and
208
reached a similar result. In United States v. Yazzie, an Indian defendant
presented evidence that the proportion of Indians in the grand jury was 45%
lower tha n the proportion of Indians over age eighteen in the general popu
0
lation of the state. 2 9 The defendant also presented evidence that the
proportion of jurors on the petit jury was 46% lower than the proportion of
India ns in the general population over age eighteen in the division from
0
which the jury was drawn. 21 The Tenth Circuit in Yazzie, like the Eighth
Circuit in Clifford, held that such disparities were not substa ntial enough to
1 994 ). Because this Article is directed at cases prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act and not
general federal laws, this Article will focus on cases that present the issue in Indian country.
20 1 .

640 F.2d 1 50 (8th Cir. 1 98 1 ).

202.

Clifford, 640 F.2d at 1 54-55.

203.

See supra note 1 83 and accompanying text.

204.

Clifford, 640 F.2d at 1 54-55.

205.

Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 ( 1979)).

206.

Id. at 1 5 5-56.

207. See United States v. Greatwalker, 356 F.3d 908 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ireland
62 F.3d 227 (8th Cir. 1 995); United States v. Grey Bear, 883 F.2d 1 382 (8th Cir. 1 989); United
States v. Black Bear, 878 F.2d 2 1 3 (8th Cir. 1989); Peltier v. United States, 867 F.2d 1 1 25 (8th Cir.
1989).
208.

660 F.2d 422 ( 10th Cir. 1 98 1 ).

209.

Yazzie, 660 F.2d at 427.

2 10.

Id.
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demonstr ate th at the venire w as "not [a] f air and re ason able" represent ation
of the community. 2 1 1 Just as in the Eighth Circuit, no Indi an country defen
d ant in the Tenth Circuit h as ever successfully ch allenged jury composition
on such a b asis . 2 1 2
The issue h as also arisen regul arly in the Ninth Circuit. In United States
213
v. Etsitty,
a N av ajo def end ant ch allenged the tr ansfer of a jury tri al from
the District of Arizon a's Prescott Division of the court to the Phoenix Divi
sion on the b asis th at the tr ansfer "deprived him of a jury venire th at
reflected the l arge percent age of Indi ans in the Prescott Division."2 1 4 Accord
ing to the court, the crimes occurred "within the territory of the Prescott
Division," and the Prescott Division "cont ains sever al Indi an reserv ations,
and consequently a f ar higher percent age of N ative Americ ans th an the
Phoenix Division."2 15 The Ninth Circuit noted th at judges h ave tremendous
discretion to tr ans fer c ases within the district and th at the jury selection pl an
1 De
in the Phoenix Division fairly represents that division's popul ation.2 6
spite the fact th at the court h ad a loc al rule providing th at all c ases arising in
either the Prescott or Phoenix Division would be tried in Phoenix, the court
held th at the de fend ant h ad not presented su fficient evidence of a system atic
tr ansf er of c ases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Division result
ing in the exclusion of Indi an jurors bec ause the de fend ant f ailed to
est ablish th at the loc al rule w as applied. 2 11 However, the court noted th at the
system atic remov al of c ases from the Prescott Division to the Phoenix Divi
sion would present a strong c ase for finding a system atic exclusion of
218
Indi ans under Duren v Missouri.
Thus, the court indic ated th at such a
pr actice, if est ablished, would amount to an abuse of discretion. 2 19
Given the cle ar l angu age in Etsitty, it w as not long before the issue arose
ag ain in a c ase with a stronger evidenti ary record. In United States v. Foot
220
racer, the district court h ad tr ansf erred the N av ajo de fend ant's tri al from
Prescott to Phoenix ; the district court then denied the def end ant's motion to
move the tri al b ack to Prescott. The def end ant argued on appe al th at the
tr ansfer of his c ase from Prescott to Phoenix denied him a jury p anel com
posed of a fair cross section of the community. 22 1 He presented evidence
indic ating th at N ative Americ ans constituted 20.78% of the popul ation over

211.

Id.

2 1 2.

See, e.g., United States

2 1 3. United States
Cir. 1 997).
2 1 4.

v.

v.

Pino, 708 F.2d 523 ( 1 0th Cir. 1983).

Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d 420 (9th Cir. 1 997), amended by 140 F.3d 1 274 (9th

Etsitty, 1 30 F.3d at 424.

215.

Id. at 424-25.

2 1 6.

/d. at 425.

2 1 7.

Id. at 425-26.

2 1 8.

Id.

2 1 9.

Id. at 425.

220.

1 89 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1 059 (9th Cir. 2001).

22 1 .

Footracer, 1 89 F.3d at I 060.
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the age of eighteen in the Prescott Division, but only 1 .73% of the popula
tion over the age of eighteen in the Phoenix Division. 222 The Ninth Circuit
once again found that the third prong of Duren was not met. 223 The court
departed, however, from the approach it had used in Etsitty and character 
ized the key language in that case as dictum. Instead, it held that there was
no systematic exclusion of Indians from the jury venire because the move
f rom Prescott to Phoenix systematically excluded all residents of the Pres
cott Division, not just Indians : " Native Americans are not treated differently ;
they are excluded to the same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in
the Prescott Division."224
A vigorous dissent by Judge Pregerson excoriated the majority for ig
noring its w arning in Etsitty and for "importing the equal protection concept
of disc riminatory intent into what is a straightforward Sixth Amendment fair
2
cross-section challenge."2 5 A petition for rehearing was filed and the opin
ion was withdrawn almost two years late r. 226 Meanwhile, shortly after
Etistty, the federal district court in Arizona amended its local rules to pro
vide that cases arising in the Prescott Division will be tried in Prescott.227
The rule change presumably prevents a repeat of the issue in that district.
The " fair cross -section" issue arose again the Ninth Circuit in United
228
States v. Bushyhead. The defendant , an Indian prosecuted for a murder on
the Py ramid Lake Paiute Reservation in northern Nevada, a rgued that his
conviction should be reversed because he was denied a panel constituting a
" fair cross -section" of the community ; the jury selection plan in t he District
of Nevada drew only from county voting lists and not from t ribal voting
lists. 229 The Ninth Circuit rejected Bushyhead's argument. The J S S A gener
ally authorizes the dist rict court to select the political subdivisions from
10
which it will obtain voting lists . 2 It seems to allow , but does not require, the
district court to select among other appropriate subdivisions of government
from which it will draw lists. 23 1 The Ninth Circuit noted that people living on
reservations in Nevada also live within Nevada counties and thus are not
purposefully excluded from the county voting lists ; they may register for

222.

Id. at 1 066 n. 1 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).

223.

Id. at 1 06 1 -62.

224.

Id.

225.

Id. at 1 067 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).

226.
Footracer, 252 F.3d 1 059, 1 059 (9th Cir. 200 1 ). The opinion was replaced with an unpub
lished memorandum disposition that rejected the defendant's arguments with little analysis. United
States v. Footracer, 1 6 F. App'x 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 200 1 ) (unpublished op.). The withdawal of
the opinion surely reflects problems with the court's original analysis of this issue.
227.
Rules of Practice of the U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF ARIZ. i . l (c) (2003) (rule relocated to 7 7. l (c) in 2004).
v.

228.

United States

229.

Id. at 909.

230.

Id. at 9 1 0; see 28 U.S.C. § 1 863(b)(2) (2000) .

23 1 .

28 U.S.C. § l 863(b)(2).

Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 200 1 ).
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el ections lik e any oth er citiz ens within thos e counti es.23 2 Th er efor e, th e court
h eld that Bushyh ead could not establish that th e jury s el ection plan was not
fair or r easonabl e und er Duren's s econd prong or that it caus ed "syst ematic
exclusion" of Nativ e Am ericans und er th e third prong. 233 Thus, th e Ninth
Circuit joins th e Eighth and Tenth Circuits in n ev er having ent ertain ed a
successful chall eng e by an Indian to an Indian country pros ecution for lack
of a jury constituting a "fair cross-s ection" of th e community. Tog eth er th es e
three circuits mak e up th e vast majority of Indian country jurisdiction in th e
Unit ed Stat es.
E. A Critique of Jury Composition Cases in Indian Country
In each of th e chall eng es discuss ed abov e, th e parti es argu ed that th e
jury pools fail ed to constitut e r epr es entativ e cross-s ections of th e commu
nity b ecaus e th ey excluded Nativ e Am ericans.234 Th e parti es and th e courts
hav e mad e three g en eral typ es of analytical errors in th es e cas es.
1. Representativeness and a Jury of One 's Peers

First, in using th e standard d ev eloped in Duren v. Missouri, th e courts
and th e litigants hav e lost sight of on e of th e original principl es that ani
mat ed Strauder: " [t ]h e v ery id ea of a jury is a body of m en compos ed of th e
peers or equals of th e p erson whos e rights it is s el ect ed or summon ed to
d et ermin e; that is, of his n eighbors, f ellows, associat es, persons having the
same legal status in society as that which he holds." 23 5
In Indian country cas es, obtaining jurors from th e ent ire district r esults
in using jurors from outsid e th e Indian country jurisdiction of th e court. Al
though n eith er th e Constitution nor th e Sixth Am endm ent us e th e t erm
"peers," th e Supr em e Court has, from time to time indicat ed that th e right to
trial by jury m eans a right to a jury of on e's p eers. 236 Since th e t erm is not
explicitly constitutional, it has n ev er b een eff ectiv ely d efin ed, at l east for
f ed eral purpos es. 237 How ev er, th e Court has sugg est ed that th e t erm is im
plicit within th e d efinition of jury and that th e t erm m eans to includ e only
thos e p ersons with th e same l egal status as th e d efenda nt, thos e who liv e

232.

Bushyhead, 270 F.3d at 910.

233.

Id. at 909- 1 0.

234.

See, e.g. , id. at 907; United States v. Footracer, 1 89 F.3d 1058, 1 06 1 (9th Cir. 1 999),
withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1 059 (9th Cir. 200 1 ); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426--28 ( 1 0th Cir.
1 9 8 1 ) (finding no underrepresentation of Indians on jury venires); cf United States v. Raszkiewicz,
1 69 F.3d 459, 462-Q7 (7th Cir. 1 999) (rejecting non-Indian defendant's claim in a federal bank
robbery case that the jury did not represent a fair cross-section of the community because, though it
included "urban Indians," it did not include "reservation Indians").
235.

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 ( 1 880) (emphasis added).

236. See id. ; Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 4 1 1 ( 1 972); see also Massaro, supra note 1 46,
at 548 ("Although the United States Constitution makes no mention of 'peers,' most people believe
the Constitution entitles them to a 'jury of their peers."').
237.

See Massaro, supra note 1 46, at 548-50.
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38
wit hin t he reac h of t he same laws.2 Since no off -reservation person can
be prosecuted for an Indian country offense unless he ventures into Indian
country and commits a crime, t he average juror in an Indian country case
is simply not in any practical sense a "peer" to t he defendant in t he case. 239
Suc h a sc heme is t hus arguably contrary to t he broader principle enunci
ated in Strauder t hat a person s hould be judged by persons subject to t he
40
same laws. 2
2. Considering the Indian Law Context of These Cases

Litigants and t he courts have also failed to give proper consideration to
t he Indian law context of t hese cases. As t he Supreme Court recognized
w hen it first up held t he Major Crimes Act, " [Indians ] owe no allegiance to
t he States, and receive from them no protection. Because of t he local ill feel
ing, t he people of t he States w here t hey are found are often t heir deadliest
enemies."241 Given t hat one of the justifications for t he Indian country crimi
nal justice regime is t he federal government 's duty of protection toward
Indians and, often, as against state authority (and state aut horit ies), how can
state voter registration lists be t he appropriate resources for creating a jury
pool ? In ot her words, w hy s hould federal courts look to t he people w hom
t he Supreme Court once described as t he Indians ' "deadliest enemies" to
construct a jury pool t hat is impartial for purposes of t he Sixt h Amendment ?
Viewed in t his lig ht, the defendant 's argument in Bushyhead was, in
many ways, the most insight ful. T he facts supporting t his case were far
st ronger t han t he Nint h Circuit recognized. In general, alt houg h the partici 
pation of Indians in state elections seems to be growing,242 Indians can be
expected to be far more invested in t heir tribal governments t han in state
governments. On Indian reservati ons, tribal governments are often more
salient t han state governments. Tribal governments often provide numerous
services, suc h as medical and dental care, social services, sc hools and edu
cation, and law enforcement. In ot her words, t he existence of tribal
238.

Strauder, J OO U.S. at 308.

239. For a discussion about the importance of the inclusion of peers on a jury, see Massaro,
supra note 146, at 552. Massaro finds that "[t]he idea behind the peer concept . . . is to assure empa
thy, not sympathy, for the accused. Empathy in this sense means the capacity for participating in or
vicariously experiencing another's feelings, volitions, or ideas. It is a form of understanding." Id.
She continues, "A jury that includes the defendant's peers-people who are able to identify with the
defendant and his experiences-may view the prosecution's case very differently than would a jury
of people who are merely 'impartial' or who are peers of the alleged victim." Id.
240.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit's assertion in United States v. Footracer that "Native Americans
are . . . excluded [only] to the same extent as all other racial and ethnic groups in the Prescott Divi
sion," 1 89 F.3d 1 058, 1 06 1 (9th Cir. 1 999), withdrawn, 252 F.3d 1 059 (9th Cir. 200 1 ), harkens back
to Justice Field's dissent in Strauder, which plaintively explained that the black defendant in that
case received a fair jury because he received exactly the same type of jury (twelve white males) that
any white defendant received. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 3 1 2 (Field, 1., dissenting) (citing his own dis
sent in Ex parte Virginia, 1 00 U.S. 339, 349-70 ( 1 880)). Such an approach thus seems patently
inconsistent with the plain meaning of the majority opinion in Strauder.
24 1 .

United States v. Kagama, 1 1 8 U.S. 375, 384 ( 1 886).

242.

See generally La Veile, supra note 96.
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governments tends to undermine the im portance of local and state govern
ments. Tribal governments tend to provide even more services than state and
local governments routinely provide to their o wn constituents. It is only
natural that Indians have greater interest in their governments than in state
governmental institutions. Thus, tribal citi zens may not have as much reason
to partici pate in state elections and voting.
While one might criticize Indians for "o pting out " o f their right to par
tici pate in the state electoral processes, the Indian country criminal justice
regime im plicitly condones the notion that Indians need not partici pate in
state electoral politics. Indeed, federal la w creates criminal jurisdiction that
is exclusively federal and tribal and thus serves to shield Indians from the
in fluence o f state officials. Under such circumstances, Indians might be ex
pected to o pt out o f state and local elections for officials who have little or
no im pact on their lives. The Major Crimes Act and other federal la ws like it
are designed to preserve a se parate existence for Indian tribes. Indeed, they
presume to preserve each tribe's right to remain alienated from the state
body politic. To some degree, the very purpose o f an Indian reservation is to
2
provide a re fuge from state governments. 43 Given this underlying rationale
for Indian reservations, it is curious that federal cou rts would look to state
voter rolls to find jurors. It undermines the very nature o f a reservation as a
sanctuary from state authority.
3. Focusing on "The Community "

Perha ps the most im portant error that the litigants and courts have made
in these cases, ho wever, is failing to use the basic theory o f Duren pro perly
by failing to focus on the pro per legal princi ples. In focusing on "fair cross
section," each o f these challenges has simply argued the wrong point. At
tem pting to achieve "a fair cross-section o f the community" begs the most
im portant question : what community ?
While the routine a pproach to jury selection may be legitimate in the
context o f general federal criminal la ws, the Indian count ry la ws are not
federal la ws o f general a pplicability with nation wide a pplication. Indian
country prosecutions are not brought to protect the national "community. "
They are brought to protect the Indian reservation community. Thus, a jury
pool that re presents a fair cross -section of the judicial district or a division
thereo f will not constitute a cross-section, fair or other wise, o f the Indian
country community. And it is only the existence o f the crime within the In
dian country community that justifies federal jurisdiction.
In Clifford, Etsitty, Yazzie, and even to some degree in Bushyhead, the
defendants tried to shoeho rn other wise strong arguments into the wrong
portion o f the reasoning o f Duren v. Missouri. In insuring a fair cross
section o f the community on the ju ry panel, Duren v. Missouri sought not to

243.
Cf B ryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 389 ( 1 976) (explaining that not even Public
Law 280 was intended "to subject reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws and state
taxation").
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seek diversi ty for diversi ty 's sake, bu t sough t to ensure represen ta tiveness
o f the communi ty so as to pro tec t the communi ty's cen tral role in criminal
244
JUSt1ce.
While Duren was a ttemp ting to pro tec t the impor tan t role o f the com
muni ty, i t may have seemed to be doing so in a manner tha t ensured
an tidiscrim ina tion and even racial in tegra tion o f the legal process. Bu t
"an tidiscrimina tion" and in tegra tion principles are no t the appropria te norms
for addressing a legal regime affec ting Indians in Indian country. The under
lying jus tifica tion for a separa te Indian coun try regime is preserva tion o f the
tribal righ t to remain separa te and to avoid in tegra tion.245 In o ther words,
discrimina tion, or a t leas t separa tism, is a posi tive norma tive principle in
Indian law, no t a nega tive one, and no t one in favor o f Indians as a race bu t
in favor o f tribes as dis tinc t poli tical organiza tions tha t have a righ t to con
tinue to exis t and exercise sel f-governance and sel f-de termina tion. 246 In tha t
sense, the li tigan ts and cour ts should look to the deeper in ten tion o f Duren v.
Missouri, which was to ensure tha t a communi ty is well -represented in i ts
criminal jus tice regime. 247
To frame the overarching problem in a slightly differen t way, jury panels
in federal Indian coun try cases are no t underinclusive because they fail to
include adequa te numbers o f Na tive Americans bu t rather overinclusive be
cause they include persons who do no t live in Indian coun try and are no t
rou tinely subjec t to federal Indian coun try jurisdic tion. The composi tion o f
Indian coun try juries is thus akin in the non -Indian con tex t to using a s ta te
wide jury pool to adjudica te a local crime. No t only is such an approach
difficul t to jus ti fy as ma tter o f criminal jus tice prac tice, i t would viola te
s ta te cons ti tu tions in many s ta tes. 248 A proper analysis thus involves a more
care ful and explici t examina tion o f the word "communi ty ."
The " fair cross -sec tion o f the communi ty" rhe toric grows from the Sixth
Amendmen t's in teres t in crea ting an "impar tial jury." Federal courts have
tended to cons true "communi ty" as the en tire judicial dis tric t in which the
offense occurred or as a division, which is a smaller subuni t o f the dis tric t. 249
In o ther con tex ts, the Supreme Cour t has recognized tha t defining commu•

•

244.

See Duren v. M issouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 ( 1 979).

Reservations exist in the United States to preserve for Indians and Indian tribes a right to
what Professor Wilkinson has called a "measured separatism," a sanctuary where they are shielded
from the authority of state actors. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE
LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES I N A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 1 1 3 ( 1 987).

245.

246. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S.
64 1 , 646 ( 1 977); Morton v. Mancari, 4 1 7 U.S. 535 ( 1 974).
247.

See supra note 1 60.

248. Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line Criminal
Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 27 1 , 272-333 (2005) (discussing state common-law principles
and state constitutional provisions on trials by jury of the vicinage).

249. See, e.g., Jeffers v. United States, 45 1 F. Supp. 1 338 (N . D . Ind. 1 978) (holding that the
term "community" is a term of art that refers to the total populace of the district or division where
the court convenes). The Jury Selection and Service Act implicitly assumes such a construction. See
28 U.S.C. § l 869(e) (2000).
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nity is , to some degree , an exercise in existentialism : " [c ]ommunities differ
50
at different times and places. "2 But rather t han creating fair cross-sections
o f t he communities served by and subject to t he Indian country legal regime ,
t he courts have ensured only t hat t he federal juries represent cross-sections
o f far different communities.
In future cases , de fendants s hould make t he straig htfor ward argument
t hat jurors in Indian country cases cannot be dra wn from addresses outside
Indian country because " Indian country " is t he community t hat t he la w is
designed to protect.
Even under t he crabbed approac h t hat t he Eig hth, Nint h, and Tent h Cir
cuits have used in construing Duren, Indian country defendants oug ht to be
able to make better arguments t han t hey have presented in past cases. Indian
de fendants have made a critical error in presenting to t he court statistics de
scribing t he entire district or division in whic h t he court sits. T he language
o f Duren recognizes t hat state wide figures are not al ways t he relevant
ones.2 5 1 W hile statistical numbers mig ht be difficult to obtain , t he commu
nity o f re ference for an Indian country case surely can be no greater t han t he
geograp hical community t hat is subject to t he Indian country la ws. T hus ,
defendants and defense attorneys s hould begin t heir analyses wit h very di f
ferent statistics t han have been presented in t he past. Specifically , t he
beginning point for demonstrating disparity s hould be t he number o f Indians
wit hin Indian country communities , for it is only t hese communities t hat are
wit hin t he Indian country jurisdiction o f t he court. Given t hat Indians repre
sent large majorities on Indian reservations , it s hould be easy to establis h
substantial absolute disp arities and extremely large comparative disparities
bet ween t heir representation in t he relevant population and t heir representa
tion on jury venires and juries , especially in jurisdictions t hat hold trials in
locations at great distances from t he Indian reservations.
To evaluate t his argument in a real context , consider t he federal district
o f Arizona. Arizona's federal judicial district is divided into t hree divisions ,
the Prescott Division , t he P hoenix Division , and t he Tucson Division. O f
fenses arising in t he Prescott Division are , t heoretically , set for trial in t he
Prescott Division. And jurors for trials in t he Prescott Division are drawn
from t he five nort hern Arizona counties t hat make up t he Prescott Division.
T he Arizona portion o f t he Navajo Nation lies wholly wit hin t he Prescott
Division and , according to t he 2000 Census , has a little more t han 1 00,000
people.2 52 A county-by-county survey o f t he five counties t hat make up t he

250.

Taylor v. Louisiana, 4 1 9 U.S. 522, 537 ( 1 975).

25 1 . Duren seems to concede that the community of reference is "this community," that is, the
one in which the crime occurred. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1 979). It further
looked to the statistical data for Jackson County, which represents the jurisdiction of the state dis
trict court in that case. Id.
252. The actual number was 1 04,565. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF SELECTED Eco
NOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: 2000: GEOGRAPHIC AREA: NAVAJO NATION RESERVATION AND 0FF
RESERVATION TRUST LAND (AZ PART) 3 (2000), available at http://www.indianaffairs.state.az.us/
tribes/Navajo.pdf.
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Prescott Divisio n reveals that the Divisio n, as a whole , e ncompasses almost
53
650,000 people .2
FIGURE

3

ARIZONA I NDIAN RESERVATIONS AND DISTRICT COURT VENUES
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Eve n assumi ng that Navajo reservatio n reside nts were as well repre
se nted as those outside the reservatio n i n the cou ntry rolls used to construct
the jury pool, the average jury would be composed of jurors draw n over
whelmi ngly f rom outside I ndia n cou ntry . As a resu lt , the I ndia n cou ntry
253. See U.S. District Court, District of Arizona, Frequently Asked Questions (Aug. 8, 2005),
http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/azd/courtinfo.nsf/court/faqs?opendocument; Arizona State & County
QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov.qfd/states/04000.html (last visited Sep. 5, 2005).
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commu nity is o nly we akly represe nted, i f at all, i n the jury pool. As a
pr actic al m atter, jury tri als th at are origi nally set for tri al i n Prescott are
quite o fte n moved to Phoe nix, which dr aws its jurors from the Phoe nix
Divisio n. The Phoe nix Divisio n h as a sm aller I ndi an cou ntry l and b ase and
an e normous metropolit an popul atio n, almost all o f which is outside o f
I ndi an cou ntry. B ased o n the demogr aphic numbers alo ne, it is likely th at
most juries he ari ng I ndian cou ntry c ases i n Phoe nix l ack a si ngle I ndi an
cou ntry reside nt . Such a jury simply c annot be fairly s aid to "represe nt"
th at commu nity.
The mor al force behi nd the pri nciple o f commu nity represe nt ative ness is
stro ng and, perh aps iro nic ally, eve n the N av ajo N atio n trib al courts h ave
adopted it. 254 I n Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, the N av ajo N atio n Supreme
Court affirmed a jury selectio n process i n which a trib al court clerk cre ated
the jury ve nire by selecti ng names from the N av ajo N atio n voter rolls (all o f
which are trib al members) and also selecti ng a ser ies o f names th at did not
appe ar to be N av ajo from the cou nty voter registr atio n rolls (which might
well i nclude trib al members, or no nmember I ndi ans or no n-I ndi ans). 255
The N av ajo N atio n Supreme Court recog ni zed th at trib al courts h ave
u nique problems selecti ng juries u nder such an appro ach ; no n- I ndi ans m ay
not feel compelled to appe ar whe n summo ned for trib al jury duty. 256 More
over, the N av ajo N atio n Supreme Court's adoptio n o f the fair cross -sectio n
requireme nt does not appe ar to be compelled by the feder al I ndi an Civil
Rights Act.257 I ndeed, although th at Act gu ar antees right to a jury tri al th at is
i n other respects somewh at bro ader th an the right to jury tri al set forth i n the
feder al Co nstitutio n, 258 the st atute actu ally omits the requireme nt for an "im
p arti al" jury, which is the co nstitutio nal hook for the " fair cross-sectio n"
requireme nt. 259 The i nte ntio nal omissio n o f the requireme nt o f an "imp ar
ti al" jury m ay well h ave bee n i nte nded to preve nt trib al courts from bei ng
forced to go outside the ir ow n membership rolls to fi nd jurors. I n other
words, the N av ajo N atio n courts provide a " fair cross -sectio n" right to de
fend ants o f the tribe's ow n accord eve n though it is not required by feder al
l aw. This is some i ndic atio n o f the esteem i n which the trib al jurisdictio n
with the si ngle l argest sw ath o f I ndi an cou ntry feels about the pri nciple, a
fact th at ought to be relev ant to feder al policym akers.

254.

See 25 U.S.C. § 1 302 (2000) .

255.

Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, N.L.R. Supp. 285 (Navajo 199 1 ).

256.

Id. at 286.

257.

25 u.s.c. § 1 302.

258. See 25 U.S.C. § 1 302( 1 0). This Act requires tribes to provide juries to anyone accused of
an offense punishable by imprisonment. The federal Constitution only recognizes such a right for
persons subject to a term of imprisonment for "serious offenses," which primarily refers to non-petty
offenses, or those offenses which carry a prison term of greater than six months. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 1 45, 1 59 ( 1 968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 ( 1 966).
259. As is its style, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court did not acknowledge the Indian Civil
Rights Act in its opinion and chose to apply the principle on its own accord. MacDonald, N.L.R.
Supp 285 (Navajo 1 99 1 ).
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In short, federal courts have erred in construing the relevant community
as the entire judicial district, rather than considering which community the
law seeks to protect. The Major Crimes Act and General Crime Act apply
only within "Indian country" as that space is carefully defined in the United
60
States Code.2 Indian country is an area in which the primary local govern
mental entity-the Indian tribe-has been stripped of its own authority to
prosecute and adjudicate felony offenses. Against this backdrop, these laws
thus provide courts with clear direction as to which community these laws
are designed to protect. While the word "community" may be ambiguous in
the Sixth Amendment, in the JSSA, and even in Supreme Court doctrine,
any ambiguity about the word in the Indian country context is erased by the
explicit definitions of Indian country in federal law. Indeed, the federal dis
trict courts would lack jurisdiction to prosecute most Indian country cases
crimes if they had not arisen in Indian country.
The crimes enumerated in the Major Crimes Act are serious but routine
offenses of a local nature with significant local effects and few effects be
yond the locality. Yet most federal juries are unlikely to include a single
representative from the local Indian community where the offense occurred
and likely will not even include a single person who lives within Indian
country. If the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a jury that is fairly repre
sentative of the community arises from the theory that the jury exists to
ensure that the affected community plays a role in the provision of criminal
261
justice within that community,
then these purposes fail miserably in Indian
country prosecutions. Because a federal jury is not composed of members of
Indian reservation communities, it cannot claim to represent the Indian
communities where major crimes occur. Thus, such juries do not ensure the
legitimacy of criminal verdicts.
4. Practical Effects of These Errors

While such convictions are thus illegitimate as a formal matter, serious
pragmatic ramifications follow from the errors in composing federal juries.
First, actual substantive errors may well creep into verdicts. Substantive
criminal law is replete with statutory language that calls for interpretations
of language by the local community, through the jury, in adjudicating crime.
For example, some crimes and defenses hinge on whether an action or per
6
ception was "reasonable."2 2 The word "reasonable" is inherently subject to
context and cultural norms. It is, to a large degree, an empty vessel that

260.

1 8 u.s.c. § 1 1 5 1 (2000) .

26 1 .

See Massaro, supra note 146, at 546 ("One function of the jury, although not the only

function, is to satisfy a community-centered interest in participation in the justice system by inject
ing representative community voices and values into the decision process.").

262. For example, the doctrine of self-defense uses the concept of reasonableness in numer
ous contexts. A common statement of the rule of self-defense, for example, is that one is privileged
to use "reasonable" force against an adversary if one "reasonably" believes that he is in danger and
that such force is necessary to avoid the danger. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 10.4 (4th ed.
2003).
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l awmakers and courts intention ally le ave empty to be filled by jurors in any
given c ase. In ot her words, t he jury is t he c arrier of cultur al norms of w hat is
re ason able in any given com munity. A jury that is not represent ative of t he
community m ay well provide t he wrong definition of t he word "re ason able,"
and t hereby re ac h an erroneous verdict. Given t he open texture in herent in
l angu age and t he peculi ar role of juries in providing me aning in different
contexts, it is possible for suc h errors to occur in a v ariety of contexts in
crimin al adjudic ations.
Second, consider a pr actic al, but even more fund ament al problem. T he
imp act and t he import ance of any sing le crimin al conviction lies in its
bro ader me aning. E ac h conviction derives its norm ative force from w hat
crimin al l aw t heorist Henry H art c alled t he "mor al condemn ation of t he
2
community." 63 Indeed, expression of t he mor al condemn ation of t he com 
munity is one of t he most profound purposes of t he crimin al justice
system. Since, in Indi an country c ases, t he defend ant's community is ab
sent, a convicted Indi an country defend ant is not likely to feel t he weig ht
of t he condemn ation of his own community. He is t hus muc h less likely to
feel t he mor al weig ht of t he verdict. T hat weig ht, w hich c auses t he defen
d ant to feel s hame, is a power ful force driving t he re habilit ative effects of
64
crimin al justice.2 Absent s hame, one of t he core purposes of punis hment
will not be met.
Jurors from outside Indi an country m ay be in some senses "imp arti al" as
jurors, but t hey m ay very well be entirely uninterested. W hile suc h a jury
mig ht be able to perform adequ ately t he simple t ask of me asuring t he evi
dence ag ainst an objective leg al st and ard, we use juries for muc h more
sop histic ated re asons. After all, a judge could perform t he s ame t ask and yet
t he Supreme Court has repe atedly s aid t hat a judge is not adequ ate to t he
t ask.265 A jury not represent ative of t he community is no better t han a
66
judge.2 It c annot be s aid to be serving any of t he ot her import ant v alues
t hat t he Supreme Court has discussed in dozens of c ases cited above. Suc h a
jury is not "represent ative of t he community" or "f airly represent ative of t he
267
8
loc al popul ation" as Taylor v. Louisiana s ays a jury must be.26
263. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoss., Summer
1 958, at 401 , 406 ( 1 958).
264. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1 880,
1 90 1 ( 1 99 1 ) (describing the sheer power of the emotion of shame which "strikes at the center of
human personality" and "forces a downward redefinition of oneself'). To perhaps oversimplify,
Professor Massaro is critical of modern efforts to leverage the shaming capabilities of criminal law
precisely because shame is too powerful to be used in a humane manner. It is inherent in every
criminal case.

265.

See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

266.

And the ramifications are real. A judge sitting as a finder of fact in a bench trial decides
cases differently than a jury. See B arry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and
McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality ofJustice in
Juvenile Couns, 38 WAKE foREST L. REV. 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 6 1 -69 (2003).

267.
268.

4 1 9 U.S. 522, 537-38 ( 1 975).

In Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 483 ( 1 990), Justice Scalia, writing for the Court,
noted that though the jury panel or venire must be representative of the community, it is to be ex-
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We might also questio n whether such juries are actually impartial. Ka
admo nitio n that citize ns of the states i n which the I ndia n
reservatio ns are located are "ofte n [the I ndia ns' ] deadliest e nemies "269 may
0
seem archaic a nd obsolete. 27 But while the relative "deadli ness " of state
citize ns u ndoubtedly has decli ned to some degree si nce the Major Crimes
Act was e nacted i n the 1 880s, state citize ns may not have the I ndia n cou ntry
commu nities' best i nterests at heart. Racism a nd bias remai n stro ng , particu
larly i n states where I ndia ns compete with no n- I ndia ns for limited
resources.271 Accordi ngly, juries draw n broadly from outside I ndia n reserva
tio ns may not be "impartial " whe n a n I ndian is a de fenda nt. 272
I n summary , the regular federal jury selection process simply does not
allow the jury to serve its fundame ntal purpose i n I ndia n cou ntry cases.
These juries are not represe ntative of the commu nity that is targeted or af
fected by the federal I ndia n cou ntry crimi nal justice regime. Neither
Co ngress nor the courts have ever addressed this fundame ntal i ncohere nce
i n the compositio n of juries i n the I ndia n cou ntry crimi nal justice system.
Because the jury 's chief import ance i n America n crimi nal justice is to give
the commu nity a role a nd because that role is crucial to the system's legiti
macy, the verdicts produced through the existi ng jury process are not
legitimate. The legacy of colo nizatio n is prese nt i n each of them.
gama's

I V.

PUBLIC ACCESS, VENUE, AND P UBLIC TRIALS

Closely related to the jury compositio n problems i n I ndia n cou ntry cases
is a related set of issues in the co nstitutio nal doctri nes of publicity a nd
ve nue. While jury compositio n pri nciples address which commu nity decides

pected that representativeness will be diminished through peremptory strikes as the panel is reduced
to an actual jury. Though representativeness will inevitably decrease, the jury's ability to judge the
case impartially will increase. Id.

269.

United States v. Kagama, 1 1 8 U.S. 375, 384 ( 1 886).

270. All Indians now have a right to be state citizens and to vote in state elections. Indian
Citizenship Act of 1 924, Pub. L. No. 68- 1 75, 43 Stat. 253 ( 1 924) (now codified as part of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 40 1 ).
27 1 . THOMAS B IOLSI, "DEADLIEST ENEMIES": LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE RELATIONS
ON AND OFF ROSEBUD RESERVATION 2 (2001 ) (surveying the circumstances in South Dakota and
finding "antagonism between reservation Indians and the surrounding populations does persist");
see Clinton, supra note 20, at 52 1 n.88; (asserting that juries in communities immediately adjacent
to Indian reservations are likely to be more hostile to an Indian defendant, due to common racial
prejudice, than a federal jury drawn from a broader cross-section of the population); Bryan H. Wil
denthal, Fighting the Lone Wolf Mentality: Twenty-First Century Reflections on the Paradoxical
State of American Indian Law, 38 TuLSA L. REV. 1 1 3, 1 45 (2002) (noting that the statement in
Kagama "is still true to some extent"); see also King, supra note 1 67, at 77 ("[J]urors, like all of us,
are influenced by stereotypes about racial groups and members of racial groups. Negative racial
stereotypes produce a 'reverse halo effect' : members of negatively stereotyped groups are assumed
to possess negative traits. and positive information about them is devalued."); cf Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 566-67 ( 1 983) (recognizing that there is "a good deal
of force," to the argument that "[s]tate courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights"). See generally
ELIZABETH COOK-LYNN, ANTI-INDIANISM IN MODERN AMERICA (200 1 ).
272.
Zuni Cruz, supra note 42, at 2 1 48 (citing "the prejudices of the jury pool" as one of the
problems in a trial for a Navajo defendant being tried in state court for an off-reservation offense).
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a case by focusin g on which community comprises the jury , the venue pro
visions address which community hosts the trial.
In recent years , transfers of venue in several hi gh profile cases , includ
in g the trial of the Los An geles police officers who beat Rodney Kin g and
the New Yor k City police o fficers who killed Amadou Diallo , have been the
73
subject of scathin g academic and public commentary. 2 Such transfers raise
concerns not only with re gard to the racial composition of the juries in the
new venue of transfer , but also a more serious problem -the preclusion of
the affected community from participatin g in and witnessin g the trial. But
while the Kin g and Diallo trials were extraordinary and received tremendous
public attention , Indian country trials are always handled outside of Indian
country. Thus , all Indian country cases are subject to the same basic flaws
that spawned extensive criticism in t hese two extraordinary cases.
This Part will address two types of issues that merit concerns for both
defendants and communities in every Indian country case. First , it will dis
cuss the defendant's and the public 's ri ght to access the trial. It will then

273.

For criticism of the venue transfer decision in the King case, see Erwin Chemerinsky,

How Could the King Jury Do That?, LEGAL TIMES, May 1 1 , 1992, at 23 ("However well
intentioned, the decision to change venue was highly questionable. The shift from Los Angeles to
Simi Valley produced a significantly different demographic composition for the jury pool. Los An
geles is ethnically and economically diverse. Simi Valley is virtually all white and suburban.");
David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different Realities, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 883 (200 1 ) ("Had
the case been tried in central Los Angeles, before a jury comprised, at least in part, of poor African
Americans or others with similar life experiences, the defense argument that the police were react
ing to a combative, potentially dangerous suspect almost certainly would have fallen on deaf ears. It
would not have been difficult for jurors chosen from an inner city community to believe what their
eyes were telling them-that the police officers brutally and unnecessarily beat an African American
man who had committed no serious crime."); David Margolick, Switching Case to White Suburb
May Have Decided Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, May I , 1 992, at A20 ("In fact, however, the outcome of
the case may well have been decided when Judge Stanley Weisberg of California Superior Court
transferred the case from the city to Simi Valley, an overwhelmingly white, conservative enclave that
is the home of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library."); Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Re
thinking Venue in Light of the "Rodney King " Case: An Interest Analysis, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 2 1 5,
2 1 6 (2003) ("Soon after the verdict some legal observers suggested that an earlier decision to order
a change of venue from urban Los Angeles to the suburban community of Simi Valley was the criti
cal feature in the acquittal." (footnote omitted)). Similar disapproval surrounded the Diallo case in
1 999. See Engel, supra note 149, at 1 665 ("Recognizing that Los Angeles jurors are not Simi Valley
jurors, nor Albany j urors Bronx jurors, leads to the conclusion that, before transferring a case, courts
first must try to solve the problem of prejudice against the defendant in the original venue."); Josh
Getlin, Cop Trial 's Move Roils New York, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1 999, at A l ("Judges 'made demo
graphics destiny,' said Newfield, suggesting the court should have tried to find impartial jurors
before moving the case. Now, he said, 'they have put New York on a path toward Simi Valley and
Rodney King."'); Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Whitewash in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1 999, at
A23, ("The problem is that the five Appellate Division judges who ordered the change of venue
went out of their way to shift the case to an almost lily-white comfort zone for the officers. The
j udges stomped all over the appearance of fairness when they deliberately placed the case out of the
reach of black New Yorkers, who the judges seem to feel are by reason of their color incapable of
considering the evidence in the case and rendering a fair verdict."); Editorial, The Wrong Venue,
N.Y. T1MES, Dec. 1 8, 1 999, at A22 ("The decision by a state appellate court to move the criminal
trial of four New York City police officers charged with the killing of Amadou Diallo to Albany
County seems unjustified. The accused officers are presumed innocent and deserve a fair and impar
tial trial, but there is no evidence that the people of the Bronx and New York City cannot be trusted
with this trial. Moving the trial to Albany, a predominantly white area, could lessen the respect with
which many residents of New York City view the verdict.").
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discuss the issue of location of the trial, including the venue provisions and
274
the implicit constitutional principle of vicinage.
A. Rights of Public Access to Criminal Trials
Public access or publicity for criminal trials is guaranteed by two separate
constitutional provisions. The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant's right
to a public trial on the theory that the public will provide safeguards to corrup
tion or oppression by government officials. The First Amendment creates a
constitutional right of access to criminal trials for general members of the
275
The Supreme Court has repeatedly

public who are not parties to the case.

emphasized the importance of public access in criminal trials. While the fed
eral Indian country criminal justice regime may pose few formal barriers to
public access, the regime creates substantial de facto barriers that prohibit
meaningful public access to criminal trials and thus may violate the constitu
tional rights of both the defendant and the Indian country community.

1. The Source and Rationale for the Right to
Public Trials and Public Access
The Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the defendant's right to a
public trial: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
276
to a speedy and public trial . . . ." This provision protects the defendant in
myriad ways. First and foremost, it "has always been recognized as a safe
guard

against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of
277
According to the Court, "contemporaneous review [of judi

persecution."

cial action] in the court of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible
278
abuse of judicial power." Open proceedings-and publicity-also improve
the quality of justice that the defendant receives by encouraging witness
honesty and conscientiousness and sometimes providing an opportunity for
279
unknown witnesses to come forward.
However, the defendant is not the only player in the criminal justice
scheme with important interests protected by public access. While the Su
preme Court has refused to hold that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
281
280
protects the public,
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
the Court

274.
For those not familiar with the term, vicinage means simply "neighborhood." It is associ
ated with a right at common law to be tried within the neighborhood or county where the crime
occurred. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 567 (6th ed. 1 990).
275.

Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 603 ( 1 982).

276.

U.S. CONST. amend VI.

277. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 ( 1 979) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 270 ( 1 948)).
278.

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270-7 1 .

279.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.

280.

See id. at 383-84.

28 1 .

448 U.S. 555 ( 1 980).
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did reco gnize a ri ght ema nati ng from the First Ame ndme nt that protects the
public 's ri ght of access to crimi nal trials. As a result, a First Ame ndme nt
ri ght, possessed not by the defe nda nt but by the public, has a n equally si g
nifica nt role a nd also serves ma ny importa nt purposes. Cumulatively, the
cases deali ng with the defe nda nt's Sixth Ame ndme nt public trial ri ghts a nd
the public's First Ame ndme nt ri ghts to ope n access to trials produce literally
doze ns of justificatio ns for the importa nt role that public access plays.
Some justificatio ns are as broad as the usual justificatio ns for ope n gov 
ernme nt : public scruti ny has be neficial effects for a ny governme ntal
28
fu nctio n, 2 a nd the public must be able to see the governme nt 's work to
83
evaluate it. 2
M a ny of the justi ficatio ns are hi ghly specific to the crimi nal trial proc 
ess. The ri ght of public access is ofte n justified, for example, by utilitaria n
philosophy about the operatio n of the justice system. The Supreme Court
has held that "public access to crimi nal trials . . . is esse ntial to the proper
fu nctio ni ng of the crimi nal justice system."284 The Court has cited the writ
i ngs of Hale a nd Blacksto ne a nd cited approvi ngly of Jeremy Be ntham's
reco gnitio n that, be gi nni ng ce nturies a go, "ope n proceedi ngs e nha nced the
performa nce of all i nvolved, protected the jud ge from imputatio ns of dis
ho nesty, a nd served to educate the public." 285
Some of the justificatio ns are not merely utilitaria n, but normative :
" [P ]ublic proceedi ngs vi ndicate the co ncerns of the victims a nd the commu
nity i n k nowi ng that offe nders are being brought to accou nt for their
crimi nal co nduct . . . ." 286 The public has a "defi nite a nd co ncrete i nterest i n
8
seei ng that justice is swiftly a nd fairly admi nistered."2 7 A nd some of the
justificatio ns are both utilitaria n a nd normative. The Court has borrowed
from Be ntham the notio n that trials have "si gnifica nt commu nity therapeutic
value" that is served o nly with ope n access to trials :
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and pub
lic protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community con
cern, hostility, and emotion. . . . The crucial prophylactic aspects of the
administration of j ustice cannot function in the dark; no community ca
tharsis can occur if justice is done in a corner or in a covert manner. [And]
results alone will not satiate the natural community desire for "satisfac
tion." A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and

282.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 4 1 2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

283. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501 , 507 ( 1984) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise /] ; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. I, 1 9 ( 1 986) (Ste
vens J., dissenting) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982) (finding a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials designed to protect
free discussion of government affairs).

284.

Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12.

285.

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569 & n.7.

286.

Id. at 509.

287.

Gannett Co., 443 U.S. at 383.
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where the tri al has been concealed from public view an unexpected out
come can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst
has been corrupted.

288

The Cou rt has also explained that without access , the community will not
unde rstand the system in general or its pa rticula r wo rkings in a speci fic
8
case , and it is difficult for a community to accept what it cannot obse rve. 2 9
In sum , the First and Sixth Amendments protect diffe rent so rts of inter
ests . Whethe r viewed from the public's perspective or the defendant's ,
howeve r, public access is fundamental to the pu rposes of criminal trials.
Without it , the defendant is denied key safeguards and the community is
denied key pa rticipato ry inte rests , not the least of which a re peace of mind ,
catha rsis , and closu re. Without access to the trial by the interested commu
nity , neithe r the defendant's inte rests no r the public's interests are served.
2. Public Access and Indian Country Defendants

As explained above , t rials for local offenses in Indian count ry routinely
occu r mo re tha n a hundred miles away from the communities where the
c rimes occu rred. 290 In light of the t remendous distances , deep pove rty , and
other daily facts of life on Indian rese rvations , the defendants , thei r families ,
the victims , the witnesses , and othe r membe rs of the community a re often
unable to attend c riminal t rials. 29 1 While the re may be no formal ba r to ac
cess , the federal regime's removal of the t rial from the community whe re the
c rime occu rred to a distant city c reates a routine , de facto denial of public
access to t rials.
Conside r that witnesses who appea r in federal court by subpoena a re
routinely reimbu rsed fo r t ravel expenses , p rovided hotel rooms , and paid
witness fees , even though the law requi res them to appea r. 292 In other words ,
though attendance is mandato ry and absence is punishable by contempt p ro
ceedings , the fede ral government subsidizes their appea rance. While such
payments may well be necessa ry to vindicate the defendant's Fifth Amend
ment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses ,
such payments seem to concede that witnesses sometimes cannot appear

288. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-571 (internal citations omitted, but citing,
among others, JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE ( 1 827)).
289.

Id. at 572.

290.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

29 1 . Admittedly, some o f the same arguments might b e made by any federal defendant i n a
large federal district. The federal districts with Indian country may be much larger than any federal
districts that the Framers might have conceived of. Of the original colonies, even Virginia and New
York are comparatively small by the standards of the Western and Midwestern states where Indian
country jurisdiction exists. For most federal offenses, there is a legitimate national interest involved
and the defendant's actions must affect national interests. Otherwise, presumably, there would be no
federal jurisdiction. As noted above, however, Indian offenses are local in nature.
292. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FACT WITNESSES APPEARING ON
BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FORM OBD 2 ( 1 996), available at
http://www.usmarshals.gov/prisoner/obd2.pdf.
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without feder al assist ance. Give n the po verty on I ndi an reser vatio ns, 1t 1s
i ndisput able th at members of the Indi an commu nity ordi narily might also be
u nable to atte nd feder al crimi nal tri als abse nt fi nanci al assist ance.
Give n th at de facto de ni als of access to Indi an cou ntry tri als c an be e as
ily est ablished, at le ast i n some c ases, the questio n is whether such
circumst ances co nstitute effecti ve de ni al of the commu nity's First Ame nd
me nt right to public access. A compelli ng argume nt c an be m ade th at they
do. While not all of the justific atio ns for public access cited by the Court i n
2
rece nt c ases require access by the affected commu nity, 93 most of the justif i
c atio ns require, or, at a mi nimum, will be better ser ved by, the i nvol veme nt
of the specific commu nity i n which the crime occurred.
Co nsider first the defe nd ant's right to a public tri al as a crimi nal proce
dur al s afegu ard. O ne st ated justific atio n for public tri als is to e nsure the
24
"i ntegrity and qu ality" of the testimo ny offered at tri al 9 and to e ncour age
25
wit nesses to perform their duties more co nscie ntiously. 9 Give n those co n
cerns, access by members of the affected commu nity -frie nds and
neighbors, i n other words, r ather th an str angers-is li kely to be much more
effecti ve i n i nsuri ng wit ness co nscie ntious ness and ho nesty. Pr actic al ex
perie nce suggests th at it is h arder to lie i n fro nt of frie nds th an str angers.
Indeed, the absence of any members of the rele vant commu nity i n the g al
lery or o n the jury m ay embolde n a wit ness who is pro ne to lie or m ay at
le ast allow the wit ness to be more c areless with the facts. I n such circum
st ances, the wit ness is not directly accou nt able to his ow n commu nity for
the testimo ny he pro vides. The wit ness's commu nity m ay well be e ntirely
u naw are of the proceedi ng. At the s ame time, the cultur al gulf m ay re nder
the wit ness less i nvested i n and less respect ful of the feder al crim inal justice
process. It is, of course, the defe nd ant's ow n neighbors who are li kely to be
most co ncerned about any attempt to "employ [the ] courts as i nstrume nts of
27
2
persecutio n" 96 ag ai nst a member of their commu nity. 9 The Supreme Court
h as also justified public access o n the expect atio n th at publicity m ay "i n
2
duce u nknow n wit nesses to come forw ard with rele vant testimo ny." 98

293. As long as the trial is open at least to some portion of the public, some of the "open
government" purposes will be met. However, general members of the public cannot provide the
safeguard against governmental misconduct that members of the Indian country community could
provide. Community members are likely to have both a greater sense of the context of the govern
ment action and a keen incentive to conduct careful scrutiny; after all, it is their community that the
crime has affected.
294.

See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 ( 1980).

295.

Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 ( 1 979).

296.

Id. at 380 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1 948)).

297. One who believes in the right of jury nullification might recognize no opportunity for the
Indian community to exercise the jury nullification power. See, e.g. , Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury
Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9 1 1 , 9 1 2- 1 3, 9 1 8-2 1 ( 1 997) (arguing that
minority jurors should exercise the power of jury nullification to overcome their marginalization as
minorities in the political process and to serve as a political protest).
298.

Gannett Co. , 443 U.S. at 383.
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Certainly, this cannot be so unless the specific community in which the wit
nesses a re located has easy access to the trial.299
3. Public A ccess and Indian Country Communities

Though the defendant's inte rests sometimes ove rlap with the commu
nity's, tu m now from publicity as a safegua rd to the def endant to conside r
the public's pa rticula r inte rests in open access. Conside r fo r example the
"community the rapeutic" justification fo r public t rials. Such a purpose sim
ply cannot be se rved unless the affected community has access to the t rial.
No othe r community will do. It is the affected community that will have a
3
" fundamental , natu ral y e arning to see justice done." 00 It is the affected
30
community that might othe rwise engage in "venge ful self -help" 1 if it is not
satisfied with the process o r the outcome.
Indeed, this p resents anothe r c ruel i rony of the existing system. Fede ral
officials o riginally justified their asse rtion of need fo r the Majo r Crimes Act
at least pa rtially on the concern that absent f ede ral t rials, the re would be an
unending cycle of violence because victims would naturally seek revenge
30
and the re was no t ribal fo rum to resolve these disputes. 2 Though that a r
gument was dubious in context (tribes had methods of maintaining o rde r
that had wo rked fo r centuries and this pa rticula r offense had been addressed
303
by the t ribe in a traditional manne r ), certainly one of the purposes fo r a
criminal justice system is to add ress w rongs within formal channels to p re
vent info rmal efforts at revenge. But how can the c riminal justice system
se rve this pu rpose if the relevant community is unawa re of the c riminal jus
304
tice system's wo rk ? Indeed, if revenge is a se rious concern, the existing
system does not add ress it ; acts of revenge might occur in Indian country
because the community has no idea that "justice" has al ready been achieved.
Public access does not necessa rily requi re actual members of the com
munity in the court room. But since fede ral trials a re not televised, they a re

299.
While this argument is being made in the context of trial, the requirement of public ac
cess also has been held to apply to other key stages of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., United States
v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 1 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (plea and sentencing hearings).
300.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 ( 1 980).

30 1 .

Id.

302.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

303.

See generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG'S CASE ( 1 994).

304.
In this regard, the Indian country criminal justice regime ironically fails also to meet
another of the key original purposes of the federal Major Crimes Act. One ostensible purpose of the
Major Crimes Act to involve Indians in the American criminal justice system in an effort to "civi
lize" and assimilate them. In debate on the Act, one member of Congress repeatedly cited the
Secretary of the Interior's arguments that such a law was needed for "civilizing the Indian race." 1 6
CONG. REC. 934 ( 1 885) (statement of Rep. Cutcheon). While such a purpose might be explicitly
disavowed in the current era, such a purpose could never have been served with trials held hun
dreds of miles from the Indian communities and without involvement from those communities.
Such trials may have helped to "assimilate" the Indian defendant who was then convicted and
served a term of imprisonment, but surely Congress did not mean to assimilate Indians one
criminal defendant at a time.
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perhaps the least friendly forums for other forms of public access. In Indian
country, it is likely that most t ribal members are not even aware of distant
federal c riminal trials even while they are occur ring. Fe w Indian country
cases are covered in the popular press such as local television ne ws pro
30
grams or la rge daily ne wspapers. And while some local com munities may
have week ly or monthly ne wspapers that serve Indian country communi
3 06
ties, fe w report on f ederal criminal trials.
To put the real world rami fications of an Indian country p rosecution in
the plain words of an Indian who served as a United States Attorney, the
federal proceedings a re practically meaningless to the Indian community :
" five Indian def endants are arrested on the reservation for the assault and
robbery and taken to federal court in Rapid City. Two of them eventually
return to the rese rvation, but three of them don't come back ; folks on the
307
rese rvation don't really know why." As a result of this lack of understand
ing of the federal criminal process and the particular facts of individual
t rials , the existing system provides none of the of the "community therapeu
tic" benefits thought to be served by public trials.
The Supreme Cou rt has repeatedly justi fied open access on the theory
that it enhances not only basic f airness itself, but equally importantly, the
308 Given that the Indian
appearance of fairness within the judicial system.
count ry c riminal justice system has famously -and fairly -been character
09
ized by legal scholars as a "jurisdictional maze ,"3 it is fair to speculate that
there may be fundamental parts of the system that are poo rly understood by
the average member of an Indian co mmunity.
The simplest way to convey the Supreme Cou rt's "legitimacy " argument
is to recognize that people are inherently suspicious of that which they do
not understand. Like the proverbial tree that falls in the forest, does a trial
that occurs hundreds of miles from the Indian community where the crime
occurred reverberate with justice or f airness ? By virtue of the federal courts'
practical inaccessibility to the Indian community, federal Indian country
c riminal trials f ail to educate Indian co mmunities generally about the proc
ess of federal criminal la w or speci fically about the facts of individual cases.
Absent involvement by the affected community, a trial cannot assure the
305. Kara Briggs et al., The Reading Red Report, Native Americans in the News: A 2002
Report and Content Analysis on Coverage by the Largest Newspapers in the United States (2002)
(unpublished report), http://www.naja.com/resources/publications/2002_reading_red.pdf (finding a
pattern of lack of coverage and uninformed coverage following a statistical analysis of the reportage
in eight of the largest American newspapers about American Indians and tribes).
306. One example is the Gallup Independent which occasionally presents articles addressing
Indian country criminal issues related to the Navajo Nation. See INDEP. (Gallup, N.M.),
http://www.gallupindependent.com (last visited Nov. 1 3, 2005).
307.
Discussion with Philip Hogen, former United States Attorney of South Dakota, Washing
ton, D.C. (September 2 1 , 2005).
308.

Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 , 508 (1984).

309. Clinton, supra note 20; Richard W. Garnett, Once More into the Maze: United States v.
Lopez, Tribal Self-Determination, and Federal Conspiracy Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 72 N.D.
L. REV. 433 ( 1 996); William V. Vetter, A New Corridor for the Maze: Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction
and Nonmember Indians, 1 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 349 ( 1 992).

Michigan Law Review

772

[Vol. 104:709

legitimacy o f the criminal justice system in general or the verdict issued in
any given case.
Perhaps most importantly, federal Indian country trials undermine the
most basic moral underpinnings o f the criminal law. I f a de fendant does not
feel the weight o f moral judgment o f his own com munity, he may not be
con fronted with his own actions in a way that would cause him to regret the
actions that gave rise to his criminal offense. This harms both the de fendant
and the community and frus trates both the rehabilitative and ret ributive pur
poses o f criminal law.
4. Public Trials and Self-Government

Jury t rials and access to these trials by the general public are fundamen
tally designed to preserve public participation in government. In a lengthy
concurrence in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, Justice Stevens indi
cated that a primary mission o f First Amendment was to secure meaning ful
30
public control over the process o f governance. 1 He explained this mission
in the context o f public t rials:
[T]he First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can ef
fectively participate i n and contribute to our republican form of self
government. . . . Our system of self-government assumes the existence of
an informed citizenry. . . . It follows that a claim to access cannot succeed
unless access makes a positive contribution to this process of selfgovernance.

311

The words of Justice Stevens highlight the dissonance that exists in In 
dian count ry criminal justice. I f the fundamental aim o f the First
Amendment protection o f public access to criminal trials is to prese rve the
communities control over government, that is, its sel f-government, then In
dians and Indian tribes have been wronged twice over. First, the Indian
country criminal justice system displaced tribal governance over the most
impo rtant criminal justice issues on the rese rvation. It then denied the Indian
community the participato ry rights that most other American com munities
have in their federal criminal justice system.
B. Venue, Vicinage, and Place of Trial

The Constitution addresses concerns similar to those outlined above in
the venue p rovisions . The Constitution addresses the broad issue o f venue
by p roviding that criminal trials shall be held in the state in which the crime
3
33
occu rred. 1 2 Though this mandate, in the past, was codi fied in federal law, 1

3 1 0.

Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 5 1 9 (Stevens, J., concurring).

31 1.

Id. at 5 1 8- 1 9 & n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted).

3 1 2.

U.S. CoNsT. art. m, § 2.

3 1 3.
( 1 988).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1 393, repealed by Pub. L. 1 00-702, Title X, § I OOl (a), 1 02 Stat. 4664
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it is currently addressed in the rules of criminal procedure. Rule 18 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure re quires that generally "the gove rn
ment must prosecute an o ffense in a district where the offense was
3
committed." 14 It further re quires the court to "set the place of trial within the
district with due regard for the convenience of the defendant and the wit,, s
nesses . . . . 3 1
The Sixth Amendment addresses a related but somewhat narrower con
cept of vicinage. It holds that the jury shall be drawn from the " State and
36
district wherein the crime shall have been committed. " 1 According to Pro
fessor Akhil Amar, the narrow vicinage re quirement in the Sixth
Amendment arose directly from conce rns by the Anti- Federalists who
"wanted an explicit guarantee that juries would be organi zed around local
rather than statewide communities. "3 1 7 As a result, Amar views the jury as an
"institution of localism and popular sovereignty ."318
One reason for the narrow vicinage right was to ensure that the trial was
"public" in every meaning ful sense. In a world with far fewer media outlets
than today's world, Professor Amar explains, "the public trial was designed
to in fuse pu blic knowledge into the trial itself, and, in tu rn, to satisfy the
pu blic that truth had prevailed . . . . "3 9
1 The pu blic trial was designed to en 
sure values of "democratic openness and education, public confidence,
3
anticorruption, and truth seeking." 20
Amar believes that the decision to use the word "district " rather than the
common law term "vicinage " in the Sixth Amendment reflects a compro 
mise by the founders to allow a political branch to make the ultimate
decision. Thus, Congress would determine the scope of any "vicinage" right
simply by defining judicial districts.3 2 1 Another commentator, Steven Engel,
would go farther than Amar. Engel has argued that the vicinage presumption
"inhered in the very notion of trial by jury " and was so fundamental to the
common law legal tradition that the right to a jury of the vicinage did not
need to be preserved explicitly.3 22 Engel highlights the adjudicative quality
of the local jury, which is likely to be more familiar with the context of the
crime and thus less likely to convict the innocent than a jury from a di fferent

3 14.

FED. R. CRIM . P. 1 8.

3 1 5.

Id.

3 1 6.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

3 1 7.

AMAR, supra note 1 38, at I 05.

3 1 8.

Id. at 106.

3 1 9.

Id. at 1 1 3.

320.

Id.

3 2 1 . While the right t o a local jury was i n some sense a safeguard fo r the defendant, i t was not
the most protective safeguard. That approach might have been, for example, to select a jury from his
own home state. Thus, the "district" requirement represented a compromise between the competing
interests of the defendant and the community in which the crime occurred. See AMAR, supra note
1 38, at 8 1-1 1 8; see also Massaro, supra note 1 46, at 508 (tracing the meaning of "district" in the
Sixth Amendment).
322.

Engel, supra note 1 49, at 1 69 1 .
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community.3 23 He als o vaunts the representative nature of the local jury ,
highlighting the jury's role as the "democratic branch" of the judiciary with
the responsibility of "injecting the v oice of the community into the admini
stration of the laws."3 24 Finally , he n otes the importance of the jury acting as
the "voice" of the local community ; as a result of the transfers of the King
and Diall o trials , he argues , the juries in those cases had no claim t o speak
for the affected communities and thus the verdicts were not viewed as le g 1t 1mate. 3 25
•

•

Engel's argument for a vicinage right rests not just within the Sixth
Amendment , but als o within the First Amendment right of access cases dis
cussed previ ously as well as cases , such as Powers v. Ohio,3 26 which
recognize the right of individual jurors to serve on juries , or at least n ot to
be arbitrarily excluded.
While Engel's argument that there is an implicit constitutional vicinage
right is compelling , Indian defendants and communities do not need to c on
vince courts t o go nearly s o far. Indian country communities need only to
have c ourts recognize a much more modest vicinage right ; that is , the vici
nage right should be coextensive with the c ourt's ge ographical
jurisdiction.3 27 F or Indian country offenses under the Major Crimes Act and
the General Crimes Act ,3 28 the geographical jurisdicti on of the court extends
only to Indian c ountry.
Given the imp ortance of the First and Sixth Amendments and the gen
eral importance of the jury in American criminal justice , the problems
identi fied above strike at the c ore of the Indian country criminal justice sys
tem. Whether the legal argument is presented as a right to a public trial ,
public access , venue , or vicinage , trials in Indian country fail t o square with
fundamental constitutional values. As a result , Indian defendants and Indian
communities are subjected to a federal criminal justice process that is of
dubious constitutional and moral legitimacy.

323.

Id. at 1 693-95.

324.

Id. at 1 696.

325.

Id. at 1 698-99.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 406 ( 1 99 1 ) ("The opportunity for ordinary citizens to
participate in the administration of j ustice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifica
tions for retaining the jury system.").

326.

327. Even if Amar's view is correct that any constitutional vicinage right is limited by Con
gress's definition of district, Congress has done a curious job of defining federal judicial districts.
Consider that the State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts while the State of Ari
zona, a much larger and more populous state, constitutes only one judicial district. The result is that
jurors (as well as defendants, witnesses, or victims) in Oklahoma are, on average, far closer to the
federal criminal trials that arise in their communities than jurors in Arizona. Such a regime poses a
disparate burden on Indian communities in Arizona.
328. One remaining question is whether such reasoning could be extended to prosecutions in
federal enclaves, such as military bases. In those circumstances, some of the arguments are equally
compelling; however, those cases involve particular reasons for the federal jurisdiction that are
fundamentally different than Indian reservations, and the background tribal sovereignty, the notion
that there is a pre-existing sovereign that has been shunted aside, is absent.

American Indians, Crime, and the Law

February 2006)

V. A

775

FRAMEWORK FOR A NALYSIS OF REFORM

Th e existing fed eral syst em has many flaws and som e of th es e flaws ar e
s erious. Ind eed, they strik e at th e v ery h eart of th e l egitimacy of th e syst em.
Th e issu es rais ed h er ein must b e addr ess ed if any m eaning ful r eform of In
dian country criminal justic e is to occur. Th e fram ework for r eform is,
how ev er, not obvious.
On e could r ead th e critical analysis s et forth abov e and mak e a r eason
abl e argument that th e federal Indian co untry criminal justic e syst em is not
fatally flaw ed, but that it has stray ed from its own guiding norms. Thus, on e
might "r eform" th e existing fed eral syst em simply by st eering it back to its
foundational norms and without oth erwis e looking outside that syst em.
Tr em endous improv em ents might b e achi ev ed simply by applying exist
ing f ed eral norms mor e car efully and appropriat ely. For exampl e, th e
pros ecutorial function should be modifi ed so that th e pros ecutor ex ecut es
h er r esponsibility in a mann er consist ent with th e th eor etical foundations for
th e ex ercis e of pros ecutorial pow er. Lik ewis e, jury composition should pro
c eed in accordanc e with th e fundam ental Sixth Am endm ent norm of
community r epr es entativ en ess. It might w ell b e possibl e to impl em ent vari
ous r elativ ely mod est r eforms to th e existing syst em that would h elp th e
fed eral syst em achi ev e complianc e with its own norms.
Working on an approach to fixing th e fed eral syst em, how ev er, is not
n ec essarily th e appropriat e plac e to b egin. A s erious effort at r eforming
criminal justic e in Indian country ought also to look outside th e fed eral sys
t em. Put anoth er way, th e r eform analysis ought to b egin on e st ep prior to
evaluation and r eform of th e f ed eral syst em. Such an effort might b egin by
asking wh eth er th e fed eral governm ent is th e prop er gov ernm ental institu
tion to provid e law enforc em ent and criminal justic e on Indian r es ervations.
Aft er all, th e f ed eral governm ent is only on e of th e possibl e provid ers of
criminal justice and public safety on Indian r es ervations.
In th e Unit ed Stat es today, th er e ar e thr ee differ ent provid ers of criminal
justic e in Indian country. In addition to th e fed eral syst em, many tribal sys
t ems ar e involv ed in criminal justic e, though th eir jurisdiction is limit ed to
misd em eanors.329 And in som e stat es (thos e in which Public Law 280 or
similar laws pr evail), stat e and local gov ernm ents hav e criminal jurisdiction
on Indian r es ervations. A car eful focus on r eform of criminal justic e in In
dian country would evaluat e each of th es e three governm ent-typ es and
d et ermin e which is b est suit ed to th e important r esponsibility of Indian
country criminal justic e. Each of th e three gov ernm ent typ es has advantag es
and disadvantag es compar ed to th e oth ers.
For exampl e, whil e th e existing f ed eral syst em has all of th e problems
s et forth above (and mor e), stat e authority in this r ealm also pos es some
probl ems. Although th e fundam ental g eographic and accountability issu es
pos ed by pros ecutions by distant fed eral pros ecutors might b e mitigat ed by
us e of local stat e pros ecutors, n ew probl ems might aris e. Giv en that th e
329.

See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1 302 (2000) .
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federal system was justi fied by the n oti on that l ocal state citi zens were the
tribe's "deadliest enemies," we might see seri ous pushback and c oncern by
tribes in resp onse t o a pr op osal t o tu m criminal auth ority over t o the states.
The cavalry effect that a fflicts federal pr osecut ors might simply be replaced
by s omething even m ore pernici ous. The pr oblem of federal declinati on and
underpr osecuti on c ould well be exacerbated or might even morph int o the
opp osite pr oblem with an elected l ocal pr osecutor using aggressive pr osecu
ti ons of Indians in s ome cases as a race-baiting appeal t o the w orst
tendencies of majority white v oters in rural districts. In other w ords, the
p olitical stakes in the outside c ommunity neighb oring the reservati on c ould
have negative effects on criminal justice on the reservati on. Yet, despite the
pr oblems related t o federal and state pr osecut ors, real c oncerns might be
raised in s ome quarters ab out giving tribes m ore p ower over criminal jus
tice. To outsiders (and s ometimes t o insiders), tribal g overnments are
s ometimes viewed as being tugged in inappr opriate directi ons by warring
p olitical facti ons and the reputati ons of tribal officials are sometimes tar
nished by asserti ons of c orrupt ibility. As a result, s ome might view the
independence and lack of acc ountability of federal pr osecut ors as a distinct
advantage that helps them, in m ost cases, t o make charging decisi ons in a
fairer and m ore objective fashi on. As this analysis of the pr osecut orial func
ti on illustrates, care ful analysis for purp oses of a reform agenda is a
c omplex task.
M ore over, any such analysis sh ould rec ognize that the s oluti on may n ot
inv olve a winner -take-all appr oach for the federal, state, or tribal g overn
ments. Because there are ways t o split the criminal justice functi on between
g overnments, it is imp ortant als o t o examine the respective r oles that each
g overnment might play as t o each instituti onal functi on. F or example, the
average Indian c ountry case n ow inv olves federal pr osecut ors appearing
before what am ounts t o state juries. And, thr ough a self -g overnment c on
tract, an Indian tribe may well have pr ovided the p olice investigative
services used in the case. In essence, the existing scheme is often one of
hybrid r oles. It is imp ortant t o rec ogni ze the fluidity of current all ocati ons of
p ower and t o rec ogni ze the p ossibility that such a hybridi zed or shared ju
risdicti onal appr oach might be m ore fruit ful than seeking t o place all
functi ons within only one g overnment.
In sum, a c omprehensive analysis of reform must take a sober l ook at
the three g overnmental opti ons and must c ompare and c ontrast th e utility of
each in pr oviding criminal justice in Indian c ountry. In taking a hard l ook at
key p orti ons of the federal system as it currently operates in Indian c ountry,
this article has s ought t o begin that pr ocess.
C ONCLUSION
The C onstituti on implicitly and explicitly rec ogni zes that crime is a l o
cal pr oblem and sh ould be addressed by l ocal instituti ons. Tw o of the key
instituti ons of American criminal justice, pr osecut or and juries, have been
designed in such a way t o execute this fundamental c onstituti onal n orm.
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Bo th prosecu tors and juries, however, fail to meet their constitutionally en
visioned responsibili ties in federal Indian country cases, primarily because
they do no t embrace the Consti tution's clear preference for local criminal
justice solu tions to local crime problems.
In most of the United States, addressing violent ac ts in criminal trials is
an expressive communi ty ac t. Indeed, most felony prosecutions in this coun
try are conducted under the direct au thority of prosecu tors who are elec ted
by the community they serve. Because the Indian coun try is deal t ou t of i ts
criminal jus tice sys tem, the process of criminal jus tice on Indian reserva
tions is nei ther an affirma tion of communi ty mores nor a formalized
expression of community outrage. To the local community, it is, a t bes t, a
hollow effort. At wors t, i t is simply another imposition of au thori ty by a
foreign governmen t that does no t even seriously in tend to occupy the soil
upon which it seeks to impose i ts will. It is a relic of the colonialis t roots of
the American criminal jus tice sys tem.
The preference for local control in the American criminal justice system
has animated the Cons titution for more than two centuries, and that has been
ins ti tu tionalized in norms of American constitu tional criminal procedure
since shortly after the Civil War. It is perhaps ironic that this preference for
local communi ty control has a parallel in federal Indian policy. In the las t
three decades, Congressional Indian policy has adop ted the rhetoric of
" tribal self-de termina tion." Local communi ty represen ta tion in criminal jus
tice and tribal self-de termina tion in other areas of governance really are not
tha t different. Indeed, the theories underlying local criminal justice and
tribal self-de termina tion spring from the same sources of liberal poli tical
philosophy and are designed to serve similar interes ts. Thus, while the de
nial of tribal self-determination has consti tu tional ramifications for a federal
criminal jus tice sys tem tha t denies local con trol of the key insti tutions of
criminal justice, tribal self-determina tion may offer one possible route out of
the exis ting morass.
If a fundamen tal principle of American governance and of criminal ju
risprudence is that crime and crim inal justice are local issues, then Indian
communi ties deser ve a far grea ter role in the crim inal justice system tha t
affec ts them. The United S ta tes Cons ti tution may well demand it.
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